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TC: A Tor control protocol (Version 1) 0. Scope This document describes an implementation-specific protocol that is used for other programs (such as frontend user-interfaces) to communicate with a locally running Tor process. It is not part of the Tor onion routing protocol. This protocol replaces version 0 of TC, which is now deprecated. For reference, TC is described in "control-spec-v0.txt". Implementors are recommended to avoid using TC directly, but instead to use a library that can easily be updated to use the newer protocol. (Version 0 is used by Tor versions 0.1.0.x; the protocol in this document only works with Tor versions in the 0.1.1.x series and later.) The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 1. Protocol outline TC is a bidirectional message-based protocol. It assumes an underlying stream for communication between a controlling process (the "client" or "controller") and a Tor process (or "server"). The stream may be implemented via TCP, TLS-over-TCP, a Unix-domain socket, or so on, but it must provide reliable in-order delivery. For security, the stream should not be accessible by untrusted parties. In TC, the client and server send typed messages to each other over the underlying stream. The client sends "commands" and the server sends "replies". By default, all messages from the server are in response to messages from the client. Some client requests, however, will cause the server to send messages to the client indefinitely far into the future. Such "asynchronous" replies are marked as such. Servers respond to messages in the order messages are received. 1.1. Forward-compatibility This is an evolving protocol; new client and server behavior will be allowed in future versions. To allow new backward-compatible behavior on behalf of the client, we may add new commands and allow existing commands to take new arguments in future versions. To allow new backward-compatible server behavior, we note various places below where servers speaking a future version of this protocol may insert new data, and note that clients should/must "tolerate" unexpected elements in these places. There are two ways that we do this: * Adding a new field to a message: For example, we might say "This message has three space-separated fields; clients MUST tolerate more fields." This means that a client MUST NOT crash or otherwise fail to parse the message or other subsequent messages when there are more than three fields, and that it SHOULD function at least as well when more fields are provided as it does when it only gets the fields it accepts. The most obvious way to do this is by ignoring additional fields; the next-most-obvious way is to report additional fields verbatim to the user, perhaps as part of an expert UI. * Adding a new possible value to a list of alternatives: For example, we might say "This field will be OPEN, CLOSED, or CONNECTED. Clients MUST tolerate unexpected values." This means that a client MUST NOT crash or otherwise fail to parse the message or other subsequent messages when there are unexpected values, and that it SHOULD try to handle the rest of the message as well as it can. The most obvious way to do this is by pretending that each list of alternatives has an additional "unrecognized value" element, and mapping any unrecognized values to that element; the next-most-obvious way is to create a separate "unrecognized value" element for each unrecognized value. Clients SHOULD NOT "tolerate" unrecognized alternatives by pretending that the message containing them is absent. For example, a stream closed for an unrecognized reason is nevertheless closed, and should be reported as such. (If some list of alternatives is given, and there isn't an explicit statement that clients must tolerate unexpected values, clients still must tolerate unexpected values. The only exception would be if there were an explicit statement that no future values will ever be added.) 2. Message format 2.1. Description format The message formats listed below use ABNF as described in RFC 2234. The protocol itself is loosely based on SMTP (see RFC 2821). We use the following nonterminals from RFC 2822: atom, qcontent We define the following general-use nonterminals: QuotedString = DQUOTE *qcontent DQUOTE There are explicitly no limits on line length. All 8-bit characters are permitted unless explicitly disallowed. In QuotedStrings, backslashes and quotes must be escaped; other characters need not be escaped. Wherever CRLF is specified to be accepted from the controller, Tor MAY also accept LF. Tor, however, MUST NOT generate LF instead of CRLF. Controllers SHOULD always send CRLF. 2.1.1. Notes on an escaping bug CString = DQUOTE *qcontent DQUOTE Note that although these nonterminals have the same grammar, they are interpreted differently. In a QuotedString, a backslash followed by any character represents that character. But in a CString, the escapes "\n", "\t", "\r", and the octal escapes "\0" ... "\377" represent newline, tab, carriage return, and the 256 possible octet values respectively. The use of CString in this document reflect a bug in Tor; they should have been QuotedString instead. In the future, they may migrate to use QuotedString instead. If they do, the QuotedString implementation will never place a backslash before a "n", "t", "r", or digit, to ensure that old controllers don't get confused. For future-proofing, controller implementors MAY use the following rules to be compatible with buggy Tor implementations and with future ones that implement the spec as intended: Read \n \t \r and \0 ... \377 as C escapes. Treat a backslash followed by any other character as that character. Currently, many of the QuotedString instances below that Tor outputs are in fact CStrings. We intend to fix this in future versions of Tor, and document which ones were broken. (See bugtracker ticket #14555 for a bit more information.) Note that this bug exists only in strings generated by Tor for the Tor controller; Tor should parse input QuotedStrings from the controller correctly. 2.2. Commands from controller to Tor Command = Keyword OptArguments CRLF / "+" Keyword OptArguments CRLF CmdData Keyword = 1*ALPHA OptArguments = [ SP *(SP / VCHAR) ] A command is either a single line containing a Keyword and arguments, or a multiline command whose initial keyword begins with +, and whose data section ends with a single "." on a line of its own. (We use a special character to distinguish multiline commands so that Tor can correctly parse multi-line commands that it does not recognize.) Specific commands and their arguments are described below in section 3. 2.3. Replies from Tor to the controller Reply = SyncReply / AsyncReply SyncReply = *(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine) EndReplyLine AsyncReply = *(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine) EndReplyLine MidReplyLine = StatusCode "-" ReplyLine DataReplyLine = StatusCode "+" ReplyLine CmdData EndReplyLine = StatusCode SP ReplyLine ReplyLine = [ReplyText] CRLF ReplyText = XXXX StatusCode = 3DIGIT Multiple lines in a single reply from Tor to the controller are guaranteed to share the same status code. Specific replies are mentioned below in section 3, and described more fully in section 4. [Compatibility note: versions of Tor before 0.2.0.3-alpha sometimes generate AsyncReplies of the form "*(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine)". This is incorrect, but controllers that need to work with these versions of Tor should be prepared to get multi-line AsyncReplies with the final line (usually "650 OK") omitted.] 2.4. General-use tokens ; CRLF means, "the ASCII Carriage Return character (decimal value 13) ; followed by the ASCII Linefeed character (decimal value 10)." CRLF = CR LF ; How a controller tells Tor about a particular OR. There are four ; possible formats: ; $Fingerprint -- The router whose identity key hashes to the fingerprint. ; This is the preferred way to refer to an OR. ; $Fingerprint~Nickname -- The router whose identity key hashes to the ; given fingerprint, but only if the router has the given nickname. ; $Fingerprint=Nickname -- The router whose identity key hashes to the ; given fingerprint, but only if the router is Named and has the given ; nickname. ; Nickname -- The Named router with the given nickname, or, if no such ; router exists, any router whose nickname matches the one given. ; This is not a safe way to refer to routers, since Named status ; could under some circumstances change over time. ; ; The tokens that implement the above follow: ServerSpec = LongName / Nickname LongName = Fingerprint [ ( "=" / "~" ) Nickname ] Fingerprint = "$" 40*HEXDIG NicknameChar = "a"-"z" / "A"-"Z" / "0" - "9" Nickname = 1*19 NicknameChar ; What follows is an outdated way to refer to ORs. ; Feature VERBOSE_NAMES replaces ServerID with LongName in events and ; GETINFO results. VERBOSE_NAMES can be enabled starting in Tor version ; 0.1.2.2-alpha and it is always-on in 0.2.2.1-alpha and later. ServerID = Nickname / Fingerprint ; Unique identifiers for streams or circuits. Currently, Tor only ; uses digits, but this may change StreamID = 1*16 IDChar CircuitID = 1*16 IDChar ConnID = 1*16 IDChar QueueID = 1*16 IDChar IDChar = ALPHA / DIGIT Address = ip4-address / ip6-address / hostname (XXXX Define these) ; A "CmdData" section is a sequence of octets concluded by the terminating ; sequence CRLF "." CRLF. The terminating sequence may not appear in the ; body of the data. Leading periods on lines in the data are escaped with ; an additional leading period as in RFC 2821 section 4.5.2. CmdData = *DataLine "." CRLF DataLine = CRLF / "." 1*LineItem CRLF / NonDotItem *LineItem CRLF LineItem = NonCR / 1*CR NonCRLF NonDotItem = NonDotCR / 1*CR NonCRLF ; ISOTime, ISOTime2, and ISOTime2Frac are time formats as specified in ; ISO8601. ; example ISOTime: "2012-01-11 12:15:33" ; example ISOTime2: "2012-01-11T12:15:33" ; example ISOTime2Frac: "2012-01-11T12:15:33.51" IsoDatePart = 4*DIGIT "-" 2*DIGIT "-" 2*DIGIT IsoTimePart = 2*DIGIT ":" 2*DIGIT ":" 2*DIGIT ISOTime = IsoDatePart " " IsoTimePart ISOTime2 = IsoDatePart "T" IsoTimePart ISOTime2Frac = IsoTime2 [ "." 1*DIGIT ] ; Numbers LeadingDigit = "1" - "9" UInt = LeadingDigit *Digit 3. Commands All commands are case-insensitive, but most keywords are case-sensitive. 3.1. SETCONF Change the value of one or more configuration variables. The syntax is: "SETCONF" 1*(SP keyword ["=" value]) CRLF value = String / QuotedString Tor behaves as though it had just read each of the key-value pairs from its configuration file. Keywords with no corresponding values have their configuration values reset to 0 or NULL (use RESETCONF if you want to set it back to its default). SETCONF is all-or-nothing: if there is an error in any of the configuration settings, Tor sets none of them. Tor responds with a "250 configuration values set" reply on success. If some of the listed keywords can't be found, Tor replies with a "552 Unrecognized option" message. Otherwise, Tor responds with a "513 syntax error in configuration values" reply on syntax error, or a "553 impossible configuration setting" reply on a semantic error. Some configuration options (e.g. "Bridge") take multiple values. Also, some configuration keys (e.g. for hidden services and for entry guard lists) form a context-sensitive group where order matters (see GETCONF below). In these cases, setting _any_ of the options in a SETCONF command is taken to reset all of the others. For example, if two ORListenAddress values are configured, and a SETCONF command arrives containing a single ORListenAddress value, the new command's value replaces the two old values. Sometimes it is not possible to change configuration options solely by issuing a series of SETCONF commands, because the value of one of the configuration options depends on the value of another which has not yet been set. Such situations can be overcome by setting multiple configuration options with a single SETCONF command (e.g. SETCONF ORPort=443 ORListenAddress=9001). 3.2. RESETCONF Remove all settings for a given configuration option entirely, assign its default value (if any), and then assign the String provided. Typically the String is left empty, to simply set an option back to its default. The syntax is: "RESETCONF" 1*(SP keyword ["=" String]) CRLF Otherwise it behaves like SETCONF above. 3.3. GETCONF Request the value of a configuration variable. The syntax is: "GETCONF" 1*(SP keyword) CRLF If all of the listed keywords exist in the Tor configuration, Tor replies with a series of reply lines of the form: 250 keyword=value If any option is set to a 'default' value semantically different from an empty string, Tor may reply with a reply line of the form: 250 keyword Value may be a raw value or a quoted string. Tor will try to use unquoted values except when the value could be misinterpreted through not being quoted. (Right now, Tor supports no such misinterpretable values for configuration options.) If some of the listed keywords can't be found, Tor replies with a "552 unknown configuration keyword" message. If an option appears multiple times in the configuration, all of its key-value pairs are returned in order. Some options are context-sensitive, and depend on other options with different keywords. These cannot be fetched directly. Currently there is only one such option: clients should use the "HiddenServiceOptions" virtual keyword to get all HiddenServiceDir, HiddenServicePort, HiddenServiceVersion, and HiddenserviceAuthorizeClient option settings. 3.4. SETEVENTS Request the server to inform the client about interesting events. The syntax is: "SETEVENTS" [SP "EXTENDED"] *(SP EventCode) CRLF EventCode = 1*(ALPHA / "_") (see section 4.1.x for event types) Any events *not* listed in the SETEVENTS line are turned off; thus, sending SETEVENTS with an empty body turns off all event reporting. The server responds with a "250 OK" reply on success, and a "552 Unrecognized event" reply if one of the event codes isn't recognized. (On error, the list of active event codes isn't changed.) If the flag string "EXTENDED" is provided, Tor may provide extra information with events for this connection; see 4.1 for more information. NOTE: All events on a given connection will be provided in extended format, or none. NOTE: "EXTENDED" was first supported in Tor 0.1.1.9-alpha; it is always-on in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later. Each event is described in more detail in Section 4.1. 3.5. AUTHENTICATE Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "AUTHENTICATE" [ SP 1*HEXDIG / QuotedString ] CRLF The server responds with "250 OK" on success or "515 Bad authentication" if the authentication cookie is incorrect. Tor closes the connection on an authentication failure. The authentication token can be specified as either a quoted ASCII string, or as an unquoted hexadecimal encoding of that same string (to avoid escaping issues). For information on how the implementation securely stores authentication information on disk, see section 5.1. Before the client has authenticated, no command other than PROTOCOLINFO, AUTHCHALLENGE, AUTHENTICATE, or QUIT is valid. If the controller sends any other command, or sends a malformed command, or sends an unsuccessful AUTHENTICATE command, or sends PROTOCOLINFO or AUTHCHALLENGE more than once, Tor sends an error reply and closes the connection. To prevent some cross-protocol attacks, the AUTHENTICATE command is still required even if all authentication methods in Tor are disabled. In this case, the controller should just send "AUTHENTICATE" CRLF. (Versions of Tor before 0.1.2.16 and 0.2.0.4-alpha did not close the connection after an authentication failure.) 3.6. SAVECONF Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "SAVECONF" [SP "FORCE"] CRLF Instructs the server to write out its config options into its torrc. Server returns "250 OK" if successful, or "551 Unable to write configuration to disk" if it can't write the file or some other error occurs. If the %include option is used on torrc, SAVECONF will not write the configuration to disk. If the flag string "FORCE" is provided, the configuration will be overwritten even if %include is used. Using %include on defaults-torrc does not affect SAVECONF. (Introduced in 0.3.1.1-alpha.) See also the "getinfo config-text" command, if the controller wants to write the torrc file itself. See also the "getinfo config-can-saveconf" command, to tell if the FORCE flag will be required. (Also introduced in 0.3.1.1-alpha.) 3.7. SIGNAL Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "SIGNAL" SP Signal CRLF Signal = "RELOAD" / "SHUTDOWN" / "DUMP" / "DEBUG" / "HALT" / "HUP" / "INT" / "USR1" / "USR2" / "TERM" / "NEWNYM" / "CLEARDNSCACHE" / "HEARTBEAT" The meaning of the signals are: RELOAD -- Reload: reload config items. (like HUP) SHUTDOWN -- Controlled shutdown: if server is an OP, exit immediately. If it's an OR, close listeners and exit after ShutdownWaitLength seconds. (like INT) DUMP -- Dump stats: log information about open connections and circuits. (like USR1) DEBUG -- Debug: switch all open logs to loglevel debug. (like USR2) HALT -- Immediate shutdown: clean up and exit now. (like TERM) CLEARDNSCACHE -- Forget the client-side cached IPs for all hostnames. NEWNYM -- Switch to clean circuits, so new application requests don't share any circuits with old ones. Also clears the client-side DNS cache. (Tor MAY rate-limit its response to this signal.) HEARTBEAT -- Make Tor dump an unscheduled Heartbeat message to log. The server responds with "250 OK" if the signal is recognized (or simply closes the socket if it was asked to close immediately), or "552 Unrecognized signal" if the signal is unrecognized. 3.8. MAPADDRESS Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "MAPADDRESS" 1*(Address "=" Address SP) CRLF The first address in each pair is an "original" address; the second is a "replacement" address. The client sends this message to the server in order to tell it that future SOCKS requests for connections to the original address should be replaced with connections to the specified replacement address. If the addresses are well-formed, and the server is able to fulfill the request, the server replies with a 250 message: 250-OldAddress1=NewAddress1 250 OldAddress2=NewAddress2 containing the source and destination addresses. If request is malformed, the server replies with "512 syntax error in command argument". If the server can't fulfill the request, it replies with "451 resource exhausted". The client may decline to provide a body for the original address, and instead send a special null address ("0.0.0.0" for IPv4, "::0" for IPv6, or "." for hostname), signifying that the server should choose the original address itself, and return that address in the reply. The server should ensure that it returns an element of address space that is unlikely to be in actual use. If there is already an address mapped to the destination address, the server may reuse that mapping. If the original address is already mapped to a different address, the old mapping is removed. If the original address and the destination address are the same, the server removes any mapping in place for the original address. Example: C: MAPADDRESS 0.0.0.0=torproject.org 1.2.3.4=tor.freehaven.net S: 250-127.192.10.10=torproject.org S: 250 1.2.3.4=tor.freehaven.net {Note: This feature is designed to be used to help Tor-ify applications that need to use SOCKS4 or hostname-less SOCKS5. There are three approaches to doing this: 1. Somehow make them use SOCKS4a or SOCKS5-with-hostnames instead. 2. Use tor-resolve (or another interface to Tor's resolve-over-SOCKS feature) to resolve the hostname remotely. This doesn't work with special addresses like x.onion or x.y.exit. 3. Use MAPADDRESS to map an IP address to the desired hostname, and then arrange to fool the application into thinking that the hostname has resolved to that IP. This functionality is designed to help implement the 3rd approach.} Mappings set by the controller last until the Tor process exits: they never expire. If the controller wants the mapping to last only a certain time, then it must explicitly un-map the address when that time has elapsed. 3.9. GETINFO Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is as for GETCONF: "GETINFO" 1*(SP keyword) CRLF one or more NL-terminated strings. The server replies with an INFOVALUE message, or a 551 or 552 error. Unlike GETCONF, this message is used for data that are not stored in the Tor configuration file, and that may be longer than a single line. On success, one ReplyLine is sent for each requested value, followed by a final 250 OK ReplyLine. If a value fits on a single line, the format is: 250-keyword=value If a value must be split over multiple lines, the format is: 250+keyword= value . Recognized keys and their values include: "version" -- The version of the server's software, which MAY include the name of the software, such as "Tor 0.0.9.4". The name of the software, if absent, is assumed to be "Tor". "config-file" -- The location of Tor's configuration file ("torrc"). "config-defaults-file" -- The location of Tor's configuration defaults file ("torrc.defaults"). This file gets parsed before torrc, and is typically used to replace Tor's default configuration values. [First implemented in 0.2.3.9-alpha.] "config-text" -- The contents that Tor would write if you send it a SAVECONF command, so the controller can write the file to disk itself. [First implemented in 0.2.2.7-alpha.] "exit-policy/default" -- The default exit policy lines that Tor will *append* to the ExitPolicy config option. "exit-policy/reject-private/default" -- The default exit policy lines that Tor will *prepend* to the ExitPolicy config option when ExitPolicyRejectPrivate is 1. "exit-policy/reject-private/relay" -- The relay-specific exit policy lines that Tor will *prepend* to the ExitPolicy config option based on the current values of ExitPolicyRejectPrivate and ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces. These lines are based on the public addresses configured in the torrc and present on the relay's interfaces. "exit-policy/ipv4" "exit-policy/ipv6" "exit-policy/full" -- This OR's exit policy, in IPv4-only, IPv6-only, or all-entries flavors. "desc/id/" or "desc/name/" -- the latest server descriptor for a given OR. (Note that modern Tor clients do not download server descriptors by default, but download microdescriptors instead. If microdescriptors are enabled, you'll need to use "md" instead.) "md/id/" or "md/name/" -- the latest microdescriptor for a given OR. [First implemented in 0.2.3.8-alpha.] "dormant" -- A nonnegative integer: zero if Tor is currently active and building circuits, and nonzero if Tor has gone idle due to lack of use or some similar reason. [First implemented in 0.2.3.16-alpha] "desc-annotations/id/" -- outputs the annotations string (source, timestamp of arrival, purpose, etc) for the corresponding descriptor. [First implemented in 0.2.0.13-alpha.] "extra-info/digest/" -- the extrainfo document whose digest (in hex) is . Only available if we're downloading extra-info documents. "ns/id/" or "ns/name/" -- the latest router status info (v3 directory style) for a given OR. Router status info is as given in dir-spec.txt, and reflects the current beliefs of this Tor about the router in question. Like directory clients, controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized flags and lines. The published date and descriptor digest are those believed to be best by this Tor, not necessarily those for a descriptor that Tor currently has. [First implemented in 0.1.2.3-alpha.] [In 0.2.0.9-alpha this switched from v2 directory style to v3] "ns/all" -- Router status info (v3 directory style) for all ORs we have an opinion about, joined by newlines. [First implemented in 0.1.2.3-alpha.] [In 0.2.0.9-alpha this switched from v2 directory style to v3] "ns/purpose/" -- Router status info (v3 directory style) for all ORs of this purpose. Mostly designed for /ns/purpose/bridge queries. [First implemented in 0.2.0.13-alpha.] [In 0.2.0.9-alpha this switched from v2 directory style to v3] "desc/all-recent" -- the latest server descriptor for every router that Tor knows about. (See md note about "desc/id" and "desc/name" above.) "network-status" -- a space-separated list (v1 directory style) of all known OR identities. This is in the same format as the router-status line in v1 directories; see dir-spec-v1.txt section 3 for details. (If VERBOSE_NAMES is enabled, the output will not conform to dir-spec-v1.txt; instead, the result will be a space-separated list of LongName, each preceded by a "!" if it is believed to be not running.) This option is deprecated; use "ns/all" instead. "address-mappings/all" "address-mappings/config" "address-mappings/cache" "address-mappings/control" -- a \r\n-separated list of address mappings, each in the form of "from-address to-address expiry". The 'config' key returns those address mappings set in the configuration; the 'cache' key returns the mappings in the client-side DNS cache; the 'control' key returns the mappings set via the control interface; the 'all' target returns the mappings set through any mechanism. Expiry is formatted as with ADDRMAP events, except that "expiry" is always a time in UTC or the string "NEVER"; see section 4.1.7. First introduced in 0.2.0.3-alpha. "addr-mappings/*" -- as for address-mappings/*, but without the expiry portion of the value. Use of this value is deprecated since 0.2.0.3-alpha; use address-mappings instead. "address" -- the best guess at our external IP address. If we have no guess, return a 551 error. (Added in 0.1.2.2-alpha) "fingerprint" -- the contents of the fingerprint file that Tor writes as a relay, or a 551 if we're not a relay currently. (Added in 0.1.2.3-alpha) "circuit-status" A series of lines as for a circuit status event. Each line is of the form described in section 4.1.1, omitting the initial "650 CIRC ". Note that clients must be ready to accept additional arguments as described in section 4.1. "stream-status" A series of lines as for a stream status event. Each is of the form: StreamID SP StreamStatus SP CircuitID SP Target CRLF "orconn-status" A series of lines as for an OR connection status event. In Tor 0.1.2.2-alpha with feature VERBOSE_NAMES enabled and in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later by default, each line is of the form: LongName SP ORStatus CRLF In Tor versions 0.1.2.2-alpha through 0.2.2.1-alpha with feature VERBOSE_NAMES turned off and before version 0.1.2.2-alpha, each line is of the form: ServerID SP ORStatus CRLF "entry-guards" A series of lines listing the currently chosen entry guards, if any. In Tor 0.1.2.2-alpha with feature VERBOSE_NAMES enabled and in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later by default, each line is of the form: LongName SP Status [SP ISOTime] CRLF In Tor versions 0.1.2.2-alpha through 0.2.2.1-alpha with feature VERBOSE_NAMES turned off and before version 0.1.2.2-alpha, each line is of the form: ServerID2 SP Status [SP ISOTime] CRLF ServerID2 = Nickname / 40*HEXDIG The definition of Status is the same for both: Status = "up" / "never-connected" / "down" / "unusable" / "unlisted" [From 0.1.1.4-alpha to 0.1.1.10-alpha, entry-guards was called "helper-nodes". Tor still supports calling "helper-nodes", but it is deprecated and should not be used.] [Older versions of Tor (before 0.1.2.x-final) generated 'down' instead of unlisted/unusable. Between 0.1.2.x-final and 0.2.6.3-alpha, 'down' was never generated.] [XXXX ServerID2 differs from ServerID in not prefixing fingerprints with a $. This is an implementation error. It would be nice to add the $ back in if we can do so without breaking compatibility.] "traffic/read" -- Total bytes read (downloaded). "traffic/written" -- Total bytes written (uploaded). "accounting/enabled" "accounting/hibernating" "accounting/bytes" "accounting/bytes-left" "accounting/interval-start" "accounting/interval-wake" "accounting/interval-end" Information about accounting status. If accounting is enabled, "enabled" is 1; otherwise it is 0. The "hibernating" field is "hard" if we are accepting no data; "soft" if we're accepting no new connections, and "awake" if we're not hibernating at all. The "bytes" and "bytes-left" fields contain (read-bytes SP write-bytes), for the start and the rest of the interval respectively. The 'interval-start' and 'interval-end' fields are the borders of the current interval; the 'interval-wake' field is the time within the current interval (if any) where we plan[ned] to start being active. The times are UTC. "config/names" A series of lines listing the available configuration options. Each is of the form: OptionName SP OptionType [ SP Documentation ] CRLF OptionName = Keyword OptionType = "Integer" / "TimeInterval" / "TimeMsecInterval" / "DataSize" / "Float" / "Boolean" / "Time" / "CommaList" / "Dependent" / "Virtual" / "String" / "LineList" Documentation = Text Note: The incorrect spelling "Dependant" was used from the time this key was introduced in Tor 0.1.1.4-alpha until it was corrected in Tor 0.3.0.2-alpha. It is recommended that clients accept both spellings. "config/defaults" A series of lines listing default values for each configuration option. Options which don't have a valid default don't show up in the list. Introduced in Tor 0.2.4.1-alpha. OptionName SP OptionValue CRLF OptionName = Keyword OptionValue = Text "info/names" A series of lines listing the available GETINFO options. Each is of one of these forms: OptionName SP Documentation CRLF OptionPrefix SP Documentation CRLF OptionPrefix = OptionName "/*" The OptionPrefix form indicates a number of options beginning with the prefix. So if "config/*" is listed, other options beginning with "config/" will work, but "config/*" itself is not an option. "events/names" A space-separated list of all the events supported by this version of Tor's SETEVENTS. "features/names" A space-separated list of all the features supported by this version of Tor's USEFEATURE. "signal/names" A space-separated list of all the values supported by the SIGNAL command. "ip-to-country/*" Maps IP addresses to 2-letter country codes. For example, "GETINFO ip-to-country/18.0.0.1" should give "US". "next-circuit/IP:port" XXX todo. "process/pid" -- Process id belonging to the main tor process. "process/uid" -- User id running the tor process, -1 if unknown (this is unimplemented on Windows, returning -1). "process/user" -- Username under which the tor process is running, providing an empty string if none exists (this is unimplemented on Windows, returning an empty string). "process/descriptor-limit" -- Upper bound on the file descriptor limit, -1 if unknown. "dir/status-vote/current/consensus" [added in Tor 0.2.1.6-alpha] "dir/status/authority" "dir/status/fp/" "dir/status/fp/++" "dir/status/all" "dir/server/fp/" "dir/server/fp/++" "dir/server/d/" "dir/server/d/++" "dir/server/authority" "dir/server/all" A series of lines listing directory contents, provided according to the specification for the URLs listed in Section 4.4 of dir-spec.txt. Note that Tor MUST NOT provide private information, such as descriptors for routers not marked as general-purpose. When asked for 'authority' information for which this Tor is not authoritative, Tor replies with an empty string. Note that, as of Tor 0.2.3.3-alpha, Tor clients don't download server descriptors anymore, but microdescriptors. So, a "551 Servers unavailable" reply to all "GETINFO dir/server/*" requests is actually correct. If you have an old program which absolutely requires server descriptors to work, try setting UseMicrodescriptors 0 or FetchUselessDescriptors 1 in your client's torrc. "status/circuit-established" "status/enough-dir-info" "status/good-server-descriptor" "status/accepted-server-descriptor" "status/..." These provide the current internal Tor values for various Tor states. See Section 4.1.10 for explanations. (Only a few of the status events are available as getinfo's currently. Let us know if you want more exposed.) "status/reachability-succeeded/or" 0 or 1, depending on whether we've found our ORPort reachable. "status/reachability-succeeded/dir" 0 or 1, depending on whether we've found our DirPort reachable. 1 if there is no DirPort, and therefore no need for a reachability check. "status/reachability-succeeded" "OR=" ("0"/"1") SP "DIR=" ("0"/"1") Combines status/reachability-succeeded/*; controllers MUST ignore unrecognized elements in this entry. "status/bootstrap-phase" Returns the most recent bootstrap phase status event sent. Specifically, it returns a string starting with either "NOTICE BOOTSTRAP ..." or "WARN BOOTSTRAP ...". Controllers should use this getinfo when they connect or attach to Tor to learn its current bootstrap state. "status/version/recommended" List of currently recommended versions. "status/version/current" Status of the current version. One of: new, old, unrecommended, recommended, new in series, obsolete, unknown. "status/version/num-concurring" "status/version/num-versioning" These options are deprecated; they no longer give useful information. "status/clients-seen" A summary of which countries we've seen clients from recently, formatted the same as the CLIENTS_SEEN status event described in Section 4.1.14. This GETINFO option is currently available only for bridge relays. "status/fresh-relay-descs" Provides fresh server and extra-info descriptors for our relay. Note this is *not* the latest descriptors we've published, but rather what we would generate if we needed to make a new descriptor right now. "net/listeners/or" "net/listeners/dir" "net/listeners/socks" "net/listeners/trans" "net/listeners/natd" "net/listeners/dns" "net/listeners/control" A quoted, space-separated list of the locations where Tor is listening for connections of the specified type. These can contain IPv4 network address... "127.0.0.1:9050" "127.0.0.1:9051" ... or local unix sockets... "unix:/home/my_user/.tor/socket" ... or IPv6 network addresses: "[2001:0db8:7000:0000:0000:dead:beef:1234]:9050" [New in Tor 0.2.2.26-beta.] "dir-usage" A newline-separated list of how many bytes we've served to answer each type of directory request. The format of each line is: Keyword 1*SP Integer 1*SP Integer where the first integer is the number of bytes written, and the second is the number of requests answered. [This feature was added in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha, and removed in Tor 0.2.9.1-alpha. Even when it existed, it only provided useful output when the Tor client was built with either the INSTRUMENT_DOWNLOADS or RUNNING_DOXYGEN compile-time options.] "bw-event-cache" A space-separated summary of recent BW events in chronological order from oldest to newest. Each event is represented by a comma-separated tuple of "R,W", R is the number of bytes read, and W is the number of bytes written. These entries each represent about one second's worth of traffic. [New in Tor 0.2.6.3-alpha] "consensus/valid-after" "consensus/fresh-until" "consensus/valid-until" Each of these produces an ISOTime describing part of the lifetime of the current (valid, accepted) consensus that Tor has. [New in Tor 0.2.6.3-alpha] "hs/client/desc/id/" Prints the content of the hidden service descriptor corresponding to the given which is an onion address without the ".onion" part. The client's cache is queried to find the descriptor. The format of the descriptor is described in section 1.3 of the rend-spec.txt document. If is unrecognized or if not found in the cache, a 551 error is returned. [New in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha] "hs/service/desc/id/" Prints the content of the hidden service descriptor corresponding to the given which is an onion address without the ".onion" part. The service's local descriptor cache is queried to find the descriptor. The format of the descriptor is described in section 1.3 of the rend-spec.txt document. If is unrecognized or if not found in the cache, a 551 error is returned. [New in Tor 0.2.7.2-alpha] "onions/current" "onions/detached" A newline-separated list of the Onion ("Hidden") Services created via the "ADD_ONION" command. The 'current' key returns Onion Services belonging to the current control connection. The 'detached' key returns Onion Services detached from the parent control connection (as in, belonging to no control connection). The format of each line is: HSAddress [New in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha.] "network-liveness" The string "up" or "down", indicating whether we currently believe the network is reachable. "downloads/" The keys under downloads/ are used to query download statuses; they all return either a sequence of newline-terminated hex encoded digests, or a serialized download status as follows: "next-attempt-at" SP ISOTime CRLF "n-download-failures" SP UInt CRLF "n-download-attempts" SP UInt CRLF "schedule" SP DownloadSchedule CRLF "want-authority" SP DownloadWantAuthority CRLF "increment-on" SP DownloadIncrementOn CRLF "backoff" SP DownloadBackoff CRLF [ "last-backoff-position" Uint CRLF "last-delay-used UInt CRLF ] where DownloadSchedule = "DL_SCHED_GENERIC" / "DL_SCHED_CONSENSUS" / "DL_SCHED_BRIDGE" DownloadWantAuthority = "DL_WANT_ANY_DIRSERVER" / "DL_WANT_AUTHORITY" DownloadIncrementOn = "DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_FAILURE" / "DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_ATTEMPT" DownloadBackoff = "DL_SCHED_DETERMINISTIC" / "DL_SCHED_RANDOM_EXPONENTIAL" The optional last two lines must be present if DownloadBackoff is "DL_SCHED_RANDOM_EXPONENTIAL" and must be absent if DownloadBackoff is "DL_SCHED_DETERMINISTIC". In detail, the keys supported are: "downloads/networkstatus/ns" The serialized download status for the FLAV_NS consensus for whichever bootstrap state Tor is currently in. "downloads/networkstatus/ns/bootstrap" The serialized download status for the FLAV_NS consensus at bootstrap time, regardless of whether we are currently bootstrapping. "downloads/networkstatus/ns/running" The serialized download status for the FLAV_NS consensus when running, regardless of whether we are currently bootstrapping. "downloads/networkstatus/microdesc" The serialized download status for the FLAV_MICRODESC consensus for whichever bootstrap state Tor is currently in. "downloads/networkstatus/microdesc/bootstrap" The serialized download status for the FLAV_MICRODESC consensus at bootstrap time, regardless of whether we are currently bootstrapping. "downloads/networkstatus/microdesc/running" The serialized download status for the FLAV_MICRODESC consensus when running, regardless of whether we are currently bootstrapping. "downloads/cert/fps" A newline-separated list of hex-encoded digests for authority certificates for which we have download status available. "downloads/cert/fp/" A serialized download status for the default certificate for the identity digest returned by the downloads/cert/fps key. "downloads/cert/fp//sks" A newline-separated list of hex-encoded signing key digests for the authority identity digest returned by the downloads/cert/fps key. "downloads/cert/fp//" A serialized download status for the certificate for the identity digest returned by the downloads/cert/fps key and signing key digest returned by the downloads/cert/fp// sks key. "downloads/desc/descs" A newline-separated list of hex-encoded router descriptor digests [note, not identity digests - the Tor process may not have seen them yet while downloading router descriptors]. If the Tor process is not using a FLAV_NS consensus, a 551 error is returned. "downloads/desc/" A serialized download status for the router descriptor with digest as returned by the downloads/desc/descs key. If the Tor process is not using a FLAV_NS consensus, a 551 error is returned. "downloads/bridge/bridges" A newline-separated list of hex-encoded bridge identity digests. If the Tor process is not using bridges, a 551 error is returned. "downloads/bridge/" A serialized download status for the bridge descriptor with identity digest as returned by the downloads/bridge/bridges key. If the Tor process is not using bridges, a 551 error is returned. "sr/current" "sr/previous" The current or previous shared random value, as received in the consensus, base-64 encoded. An empty value means that either the consensus has no shared random value, or Tor has no consensus. [New in Tor 0.3.1.0-alpha.] "config-can-saveconf" 0 or 1, depending on whether it is possile to use SAVECONF without the FORCE flag. (Introduced in 0.3.1.1-alpha.) Examples: C: GETINFO version desc/name/moria1 S: 250+desc/name/moria= S: [Descriptor for moria] S: . S: 250-version=Tor 0.1.1.0-alpha-cvs S: 250 OK 3.10. EXTENDCIRCUIT Sent from the client to the server. The format is: "EXTENDCIRCUIT" SP CircuitID [SP ServerSpec *("," ServerSpec)] [SP "purpose=" Purpose] CRLF This request takes one of two forms: either the CircuitID is zero, in which case it is a request for the server to build a new circuit, or the CircuitID is nonzero, in which case it is a request for the server to extend an existing circuit with that ID according to the specified path. If the CircuitID is 0, the controller has the option of providing a path for Tor to use to build the circuit. If it does not provide a path, Tor will select one automatically from high capacity nodes according to path-spec.txt. If CircuitID is 0 and "purpose=" is specified, then the circuit's purpose is set. Two choices are recognized: "general" and "controller". If not specified, circuits are created as "general". If the request is successful, the server sends a reply containing a message body consisting of the CircuitID of the (maybe newly created) circuit. The syntax is "250" SP "EXTENDED" SP CircuitID CRLF. 3.11. SETCIRCUITPURPOSE Sent from the client to the server. The format is: "SETCIRCUITPURPOSE" SP CircuitID SP "purpose=" Purpose CRLF This changes the circuit's purpose. See EXTENDCIRCUIT above for details. 3.12. SETROUTERPURPOSE Sent from the client to the server. The format is: "SETROUTERPURPOSE" SP NicknameOrKey SP Purpose CRLF This changes the descriptor's purpose. See +POSTDESCRIPTOR below for details. NOTE: This command was disabled and made obsolete as of Tor 0.2.0.8-alpha. It doesn't exist anymore, and is listed here only for historical interest. 3.13. ATTACHSTREAM Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "ATTACHSTREAM" SP StreamID SP CircuitID [SP "HOP=" HopNum] CRLF This message informs the server that the specified stream should be associated with the specified circuit. Each stream may be associated with at most one circuit, and multiple streams may share the same circuit. Streams can only be attached to completed circuits (that is, circuits that have sent a circuit status 'BUILT' event or are listed as built in a GETINFO circuit-status request). If the circuit ID is 0, responsibility for attaching the given stream is returned to Tor. If HOP=HopNum is specified, Tor will choose the HopNumth hop in the circuit as the exit node, rather than the last node in the circuit. Hops are 1-indexed; generally, it is not permitted to attach to hop 1. Tor responds with "250 OK" if it can attach the stream, 552 if the circuit or stream didn't exist, 555 if the stream isn't in an appropriate state to be attached (e.g. it's already open), or 551 if the stream couldn't be attached for another reason. {Implementation note: Tor will close unattached streams by itself, roughly two minutes after they are born. Let the developers know if that turns out to be a problem.} {Implementation note: By default, Tor automatically attaches streams to circuits itself, unless the configuration variable "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is set to "1". Attempting to attach streams via TC when "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is false may cause a race between Tor and the controller, as both attempt to attach streams to circuits.} {Implementation note: You can try to attachstream to a stream that has already sent a connect or resolve request but hasn't succeeded yet, in which case Tor will detach the stream from its current circuit before proceeding with the new attach request.} 3.14. POSTDESCRIPTOR Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "+POSTDESCRIPTOR" [SP "purpose=" Purpose] [SP "cache=" Cache] CRLF Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF This message informs the server about a new descriptor. If Purpose is specified, it must be either "general", "controller", or "bridge", else we return a 552 error. The default is "general". If Cache is specified, it must be either "no" or "yes", else we return a 552 error. If Cache is not specified, Tor will decide for itself whether it wants to cache the descriptor, and controllers must not rely on its choice. The descriptor, when parsed, must contain a number of well-specified fields, including fields for its nickname and identity. If there is an error in parsing the descriptor, the server must send a "554 Invalid descriptor" reply. If the descriptor is well-formed but the server chooses not to add it, it must reply with a 251 message whose body explains why the server was not added. If the descriptor is added, Tor replies with "250 OK". 3.15. REDIRECTSTREAM Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "REDIRECTSTREAM" SP StreamID SP Address [SP Port] CRLF Tells the server to change the exit address on the specified stream. If Port is specified, changes the destination port as well. No remapping is performed on the new provided address. To be sure that the modified address will be used, this event must be sent after a new stream event is received, and before attaching this stream to a circuit. Tor replies with "250 OK" on success. 3.16. CLOSESTREAM Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is: "CLOSESTREAM" SP StreamID SP Reason *(SP Flag) CRLF Tells the server to close the specified stream. The reason should be one of the Tor RELAY_END reasons given in tor-spec.txt, as a decimal. Flags is not used currently; Tor servers SHOULD ignore unrecognized flags. Tor may hold the stream open for a while to flush any data that is pending. Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there aren't enough arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the StreamID or reason. 3.17. CLOSECIRCUIT The syntax is: "CLOSECIRCUIT" SP CircuitID *(SP Flag) CRLF Flag = "IfUnused" Tells the server to close the specified circuit. If "IfUnused" is provided, do not close the circuit unless it is unused. Other flags may be defined in the future; Tor SHOULD ignore unrecognized flags. Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there aren't enough arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the CircuitID. 3.18. QUIT Tells the server to hang up on this controller connection. This command can be used before authenticating. 3.19. USEFEATURE Adding additional features to the control protocol sometimes will break backwards compatibility. Initially such features are added into Tor and disabled by default. USEFEATURE can enable these additional features. The syntax is: "USEFEATURE" *(SP FeatureName) CRLF FeatureName = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-") Feature names are case-insensitive. Once enabled, a feature stays enabled for the duration of the connection to the controller. A new connection to the controller must be opened to disable an enabled feature. Features are a forward-compatibility mechanism; each feature will eventually become a standard part of the control protocol. Once a feature becomes part of the protocol, it is always-on. Each feature documents the version it was introduced as a feature and the version in which it became part of the protocol. Tor will ignore a request to use any feature that is always-on. Tor will give a 552 error in response to an unrecognized feature. EXTENDED_EVENTS Same as passing 'EXTENDED' to SETEVENTS; this is the preferred way to request the extended event syntax. This feature was first introduced in 0.1.2.3-alpha. It is always-on and part of the protocol in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later. VERBOSE_NAMES Replaces ServerID with LongName in events and GETINFO results. LongName provides a Fingerprint for all routers, an indication of Named status, and a Nickname if one is known. LongName is strictly more informative than ServerID, which only provides either a Fingerprint or a Nickname. This feature was first introduced in 0.1.2.2-alpha. It is always-on and part of the protocol in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later. 3.20. RESOLVE The syntax is "RESOLVE" *Option *Address CRLF Option = "mode=reverse" Address = a hostname or IPv4 address This command launches a remote hostname lookup request for every specified request (or reverse lookup if "mode=reverse" is specified). Note that the request is done in the background: to see the answers, your controller will need to listen for ADDRMAP events; see 4.1.7 below. [Added in Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha] 3.21. PROTOCOLINFO The syntax is: "PROTOCOLINFO" *(SP PIVERSION) CRLF The server reply format is: "250-PROTOCOLINFO" SP PIVERSION CRLF *InfoLine "250 OK" CRLF InfoLine = AuthLine / VersionLine / OtherLine AuthLine = "250-AUTH" SP "METHODS=" AuthMethod *("," AuthMethod) *(SP "COOKIEFILE=" AuthCookieFile) CRLF VersionLine = "250-VERSION" SP "Tor=" TorVersion OptArguments CRLF AuthMethod = "NULL" / ; No authentication is required "HASHEDPASSWORD" / ; A controller must supply the original password "COOKIE" / ; A controller must supply the contents of a cookie "SAFECOOKIE" ; A controller must prove knowledge of a cookie AuthCookieFile = QuotedString TorVersion = QuotedString OtherLine = "250-" Keyword OptArguments CRLF PIVERSION: 1*DIGIT Tor MAY give its InfoLines in any order; controllers MUST ignore InfoLines with keywords they do not recognize. Controllers MUST ignore extraneous data on any InfoLine. PIVERSION is there in case we drastically change the syntax one day. For now it should always be "1". Controllers MAY provide a list of the protocolinfo versions they support; Tor MAY select a version that the controller does not support. AuthMethod is used to specify one or more control authentication methods that Tor currently accepts. AuthCookieFile specifies the absolute path and filename of the authentication cookie that Tor is expecting and is provided iff the METHODS field contains the method "COOKIE" and/or "SAFECOOKIE". Controllers MUST handle escape sequences inside this string. All authentication cookies are 32 bytes long. Controllers MUST NOT use the contents of a non-32-byte-long file as an authentication cookie. If the METHODS field contains the method "SAFECOOKIE", every AuthCookieFile must contain the same authentication cookie. The COOKIE authentication method exposes the user running a controller to an unintended information disclosure attack whenever the controller has greater filesystem read access than the process that it has connected to. (Note that a controller may connect to a process other than Tor.) It is almost never safe to use, even if the controller's user has explicitly specified which filename to read an authentication cookie from. For this reason, the COOKIE authentication method has been deprecated and will be removed from a future version of Tor. The VERSION line contains the Tor version. [Unlike other commands besides AUTHENTICATE, PROTOCOLINFO may be used (but only once!) before AUTHENTICATE.] [PROTOCOLINFO was not supported before Tor 0.2.0.5-alpha.] 3.22. LOADCONF The syntax is: "+LOADCONF" CRLF ConfigText CRLF "." CRLF This command allows a controller to upload the text of a config file to Tor over the control port. This config file is then loaded as if it had been read from disk. [LOADCONF was added in Tor 0.2.1.1-alpha.] 3.23. TAKEOWNERSHIP The syntax is: "TAKEOWNERSHIP" CRLF This command instructs Tor to shut down when this control connection is closed. This command affects each control connection that sends it independently; if multiple control connections send the TAKEOWNERSHIP command to a Tor instance, Tor will shut down when any of those connections closes. (As of Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha, Tor does not wait a while for circuits to close when shutting down because of an exiting controller. If you want to ensure a clean shutdown--and you should!--then send "SIGNAL SHUTDOWN" and wait for the Tor process to close.) This command is intended to be used with the __OwningControllerProcess configuration option. A controller that starts a Tor process which the user cannot easily control or stop should 'own' that Tor process: * When starting Tor, the controller should specify its PID in an __OwningControllerProcess on Tor's command line. This will cause Tor to poll for the existence of a process with that PID, and exit if it does not find such a process. (This is not a completely reliable way to detect whether the 'owning controller' is still running, but it should work well enough in most cases.) * Once the controller has connected to Tor's control port, it should send the TAKEOWNERSHIP command along its control connection. At this point, *both* the TAKEOWNERSHIP command and the __OwningControllerProcess option are in effect: Tor will exit when the control connection ends *and* Tor will exit if it detects that there is no process with the PID specified in the __OwningControllerProcess option. * After the controller has sent the TAKEOWNERSHIP command, it should send "RESETCONF __OwningControllerProcess" along its control connection. This will cause Tor to stop polling for the existence of a process with its owning controller's PID; Tor will still exit when the control connection ends. [TAKEOWNERSHIP was added in Tor 0.2.2.28-beta.] 3.24. AUTHCHALLENGE The syntax is: "AUTHCHALLENGE" SP "SAFECOOKIE" SP ClientNonce CRLF ClientNonce = 2*HEXDIG / QuotedString If the server accepts the command, the server reply format is: "250 AUTHCHALLENGE" SP "SERVERHASH=" ServerHash SP "SERVERNONCE=" ServerNonce CRLF ServerHash = 64*64HEXDIG ServerNonce = 64*64HEXDIG The ClientNonce, ServerHash, and ServerNonce values are encoded/decoded in the same way as the argument passed to the AUTHENTICATE command. ServerNonce MUST be 32 bytes long. ServerHash is computed as: HMAC-SHA256("Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash", CookieString | ClientNonce | ServerNonce) (with the HMAC key as its first argument) After a controller sends a successful AUTHCHALLENGE command, the next command sent on the connection must be an AUTHENTICATE command, and the only authentication string which that AUTHENTICATE command will accept is: HMAC-SHA256("Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash", CookieString | ClientNonce | ServerNonce) [Unlike other commands besides AUTHENTICATE, AUTHCHALLENGE may be used (but only once!) before AUTHENTICATE.] [AUTHCHALLENGE was added in Tor 0.2.3.13-alpha.] 3.25. DROPGUARDS The syntax is: "DROPGUARDS" CRLF Tells the server to drop all guard nodes. Do not invoke this command lightly; it can increase vulnerability to tracking attacks over time. Tor replies with "250 OK" on success. [DROPGUARDS was added in Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.] 3.26. HSFETCH The syntax is: "HSFETCH" SP (HSAddress / "v" Version "-" DescId) *[SP "SERVER=" Server] CRLF HSAddress = 16*Base32Character Version = 2 DescId = 32*Base32Character Server = LongName This command launches hidden service descriptor fetch(es) for the given HSAddress or DescId. If a DescId is specified, at least one Server MUST also be provided, otherwise a 512 error is returned. If no DescId and Server(s) are specified, it behaves like a normal Tor client descriptor fetch. If one or more Server are given, they are used instead triggering a fetch on each of them in parallel. The caching behavior when fetching a descriptor using this command is identical to normal Tor client behavior. Details on how to compute a descriptor id (DescId) can be found in rend-spec.txt section 1.3. If any values are unrecognized, a 513 error is returned and the command is stopped. On success, Tor replies "250 OK" then Tor MUST eventually follow this with both a HS_DESC and HS_DESC_CONTENT events with the results. If SERVER is specified then events are emitted for each location. Examples are: C: HSFETCH v2-gezdgnbvgy3tqolbmjrwizlgm5ugs2tl SERVER=9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31 S: 250 OK C: HSFETCH ajkhdsfuygaesfaa S: 250 OK [HSFETCH was added in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha] 3.27. ADD_ONION The syntax is: "ADD_ONION" SP KeyType ":" KeyBlob [SP "Flags=" Flag *("," Flag)] 1*(SP "Port=" VirtPort ["," Target]) *(SP "ClientAuth=" ClientName [":" ClientBlob]) CRLF KeyType = "NEW" / ; The server should generate a key of algorithm KeyBlob "RSA1024" ; The server should use the 1024 bit RSA key provided in as KeyBlob KeyBlob = "BEST" / ; The server should generate a key using the "best" supported algorithm (KeyType == "NEW") "RSA1024" / ; The server should generate a 1024 bit RSA key (KeyType == "NEW") String ; A serialized private key (without whitespace) Flag = "DiscardPK" / ; The server should not include the newly generated private key as part of the response. "Detach" / ; Do not associate the newly created Onion Service to the current control connection. "BasicAuth" / ; Client authorization is required using the "basic" method. "NonAnonymous"; Add a non-anonymous Single Onion Service. Tor checks this flag matches its configured hidden service anonymity mode. VirtPort = The virtual TCP Port for the Onion Service (As in the HiddenServicePort "VIRTPORT" argument). Target = The (optional) target for the given VirtPort (As in the optional HiddenServicePort "TARGET" argument). ClientName = An identifier 1 to 16 characters long, using only characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). ClientBlob = Authorization data for the client, in an opaque format specific to the authorization method. The server reply format is: "250-ServiceID=" ServiceID CRLF ["250-PrivateKey=" KeyType ":" KeyBlob CRLF] *("250-ClientAuth=" ClientName ":" ClientBlob CRLF) "250 OK" CRLF ServiceID = The Onion Service address without the trailing ".onion" suffix Tells the server to create a new Onion ("Hidden") Service, with the specified private key and algorithm. If a KeyType of "NEW" is selected, the server will generate a new keypair using the selected algorithm. The "Port" argument's VirtPort and Target values have identical semantics to the corresponding HiddenServicePort configuration values. The server response will only include a private key if the server was requested to generate a new keypair, and also the "DiscardPK" flag was not specified. (Note that if "DiscardPK" flag is specified, there is no way to recreate the generated keypair and the corresponding Onion Service at a later date). If client authorization is enabled using the "BasicAuth" flag, the service will not be accessible to clients without valid authorization data (configured with the "HidServAuth" option). The list of authorized clients is specified with one or more "ClientAuth" parameters. If "ClientBlob" is not specified for a client, a new credential will be randomly generated and returned. Tor instances can either be in anonymous hidden service mode, or non-anonymous single onion service mode. All hidden services on the same tor instance have the same anonymity. To guard against unexpected loss of anonymity, Tor checks that the ADD_ONION "NonAnonymous" flag matches the current hidden service anonymity mode. The hidden service anonymity mode is configured using the Tor options HiddenServiceSingleHopMode and HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode. If both these options are 1, the "NonAnonymous" flag must be provided to ADD_ONION. If both these options are 0 (the Tor default), the flag must NOT be provided. Once created the new Onion Service will remain active until either the Onion Service is removed via "DEL_ONION", the server terminates, or the control connection that originated the "ADD_ONION" command is closed. It is possible to override disabling the Onion Service on control connection close by specifying the "Detach" flag. It is the Onion Service server application's responsibility to close existing client connections if desired after the Onion Service is removed. (The KeyBlob format is left intentionally opaque, however for "RSA1024" keys it is currently the Base64 encoded DER representation of a PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey, with all newlines removed.) Examples: C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK Port=80 S: 250-ServiceID=exampleonion1234 S: 250 OK C: ADD_ONION RSA1024:[Blob Redacted] Port=80,192.168.1.1:8080 S: 250-ServiceID=sampleonion12456 S: 250 OK C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Port=22 Port=80,8080 S: 250-ServiceID=testonion1234567 S: 250-PrivateKey=RSA1024:[Blob Redacted] S: 250 OK C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK,BasicAuth Port=22 ClientAuth=alice:[Blob Redacted] ClientAuth=bob S: 250-ServiceID=testonion1234567 S: 250-ClientAuth=bob:[Blob Redacted] S: 250 OK Examples with Tor in anonymous onion service mode: C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK Port=22 S: 250-ServiceID=testonion1234567 S: 250 OK C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK,NonAnonymous Port=22 S: 512 Tor is in anonymous hidden service mode Examples with Tor in non-anonymous onion service mode: C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK Port=22 S: 512 Tor is in non-anonymous hidden service mode C: ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK,NonAnonymous Port=22 S: 250-ServiceID=testonion1234567 S: 250 OK [ADD_ONION was added in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha.] [ClientAuth was added in Tor 0.2.9.1-alpha.] [NonAnonymous was added in Tor 0.2.9.3-alpha.] 3.28. DEL_ONION The syntax is: "DEL_ONION" SP ServiceID CRLF ServiceID = The Onion Service address without the trailing ".onion" suffix Tells the server to remove an Onion ("Hidden") Service, that was previously created via an "ADD_ONION" command. It is only possible to remove Onion Services that were created on the same control connection as the "DEL_ONION" command, and those that belong to no control connection in particular (The "Detach" flag was specified at creation). If the ServiceID is invalid, or is neither owned by the current control connection nor a detached Onion Service, the server will return a 552. It is the Onion Service server application's responsibility to close existing client connections if desired after the Onion Service has been removed via "DEL_ONION". Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there are an invalid number of arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the ServiceID. [DEL_ONION was added in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha.] 3.29. HSPOST The syntax is: "+HSPOST" *[SP "SERVER=" Server] CRLF Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF Server = LongName Descriptor = The text of the descriptor formatted as specified in rend-spec.txt section 1.3. This command launches a hidden service descriptor upload to the specified HSDirs. If one or more Server arguments are provided, an upload is triggered on each of them in parallel. If no Server options are provided, it behaves like a normal HS descriptor upload and will upload to the set of responsible HS directories. If any value is unrecognized, a 552 error is returned and the command is stopped. If there is an error in parsing the descriptor, the server must send a "554 Invalid descriptor" reply. On success, Tor replies "250 OK" then Tor MUST eventually follow this with a HS_DESC event with the result for each upload location. Examples are: C: +HSPOST SERVER=9695DFC35FFEB861329B9F1AB04C46397020CE31 [DESCRIPTOR] . S: 250 OK [HSPOST was added in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha] 4. Replies Reply codes follow the same 3-character format as used by SMTP, with the first character defining a status, the second character defining a subsystem, and the third designating fine-grained information. The TC protocol currently uses the following first characters: 2yz Positive Completion Reply The command was successful; a new request can be started. 4yz Temporary Negative Completion reply The command was unsuccessful but might be reattempted later. 5yz Permanent Negative Completion Reply The command was unsuccessful; the client should not try exactly that sequence of commands again. 6yz Asynchronous Reply Sent out-of-order in response to an earlier SETEVENTS command. The following second characters are used: x0z Syntax Sent in response to ill-formed or nonsensical commands. x1z Protocol Refers to operations of the Tor Control protocol. x5z Tor Refers to actual operations of Tor system. The following codes are defined: 250 OK 251 Operation was unnecessary [Tor has declined to perform the operation, but no harm was done.] 451 Resource exhausted 500 Syntax error: protocol 510 Unrecognized command 511 Unimplemented command 512 Syntax error in command argument 513 Unrecognized command argument 514 Authentication required 515 Bad authentication 550 Unspecified Tor error 551 Internal error [Something went wrong inside Tor, so that the client's request couldn't be fulfilled.] 552 Unrecognized entity [A configuration key, a stream ID, circuit ID, event, mentioned in the command did not actually exist.] 553 Invalid configuration value [The client tried to set a configuration option to an incorrect, ill-formed, or impossible value.] 554 Invalid descriptor 555 Unmanaged entity 650 Asynchronous event notification Unless specified to have specific contents, the human-readable messages in error replies should not be relied upon to match those in this document. 4.1. Asynchronous events These replies can be sent after a corresponding SETEVENTS command has been received. They will not be interleaved with other Reply elements, but they can appear between a command and its corresponding reply. For example, this sequence is possible: C: SETEVENTS CIRC S: 250 OK C: GETCONF SOCKSPORT ORPORT S: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2 S: 250-SOCKSPORT=9050 S: 250 ORPORT=0 But this sequence is disallowed: C: SETEVENTS CIRC S: 250 OK C: GETCONF SOCKSPORT ORPORT S: 250-SOCKSPORT=9050 S: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2 S: 250 ORPORT=0 Clients MUST tolerate more arguments in an asynchronous reply than expected, and MUST tolerate more lines in an asynchronous reply than expected. For instance, a client that expects a CIRC message like: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2 must tolerate: 650-CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2 0xBEEF 650-EXTRAMAGIC=99 650 ANONYMITY=high If clients receives extended events (selected by USEFEATUERE EXTENDED_EVENTS in Tor 0.1.2.2-alpha..Tor-0.2.1.x, and always-on in Tor 0.2.2.x and later), then each event line as specified below may be followed by additional arguments and additional lines. Additional lines will be of the form: "650" ("-"/" ") KEYWORD ["=" ARGUMENTS] CRLF Additional arguments will be of the form SP KEYWORD ["=" ( QuotedString / * NonSpDquote ) ] Clients MUST tolerate events with arguments and keywords they do not recognize, and SHOULD process those events as if any unrecognized arguments and keywords were not present. Clients SHOULD NOT depend on the order of keyword=value arguments, and SHOULD NOT depend on there being no new keyword=value arguments appearing between existing keyword=value arguments, though as of this writing (Jun 2011) some do. Thus, extensions to this protocol should add new keywords only after the existing keywords, until all controllers have been fixed. At some point this "SHOULD NOT" might become a "MUST NOT". 4.1.1. Circuit status changed The syntax is: "650" SP "CIRC" SP CircuitID SP CircStatus [SP Path] [SP "BUILD_FLAGS=" BuildFlags] [SP "PURPOSE=" Purpose] [SP "HS_STATE=" HSState] [SP "REND_QUERY=" HSAddress] [SP "TIME_CREATED=" TimeCreated] [SP "REASON=" Reason [SP "REMOTE_REASON=" Reason]] [SP "SOCKS_USERNAME=" EscapedUsername] [SP "SOCKS_PASSWORD=" EscapedPassword] CRLF CircStatus = "LAUNCHED" / ; circuit ID assigned to new circuit "BUILT" / ; all hops finished, can now accept streams "GUARD_WAIT" / ; all hops finished, waiting to see if a ; circuit with a better guard will be usable. "EXTENDED" / ; one more hop has been completed "FAILED" / ; circuit closed (was not built) "CLOSED" ; circuit closed (was built) Path = LongName *("," LongName) ; In Tor versions 0.1.2.2-alpha through 0.2.2.1-alpha with feature ; VERBOSE_NAMES turned off and before version 0.1.2.2-alpha, Path ; is as follows: ; Path = ServerID *("," ServerID) BuildFlags = BuildFlag *("," BuildFlag) BuildFlag = "ONEHOP_TUNNEL" / "IS_INTERNAL" / "NEED_CAPACITY" / "NEED_UPTIME" Purpose = "GENERAL" / "HS_CLIENT_INTRO" / "HS_CLIENT_REND" / "HS_SERVICE_INTRO" / "HS_SERVICE_REND" / "TESTING" / "CONTROLLER" / "MEASURE_TIMEOUT" HSState = "HSCI_CONNECTING" / "HSCI_INTRO_SENT" / "HSCI_DONE" / "HSCR_CONNECTING" / "HSCR_ESTABLISHED_IDLE" / "HSCR_ESTABLISHED_WAITING" / "HSCR_JOINED" / "HSSI_CONNECTING" / "HSSI_ESTABLISHED" / "HSSR_CONNECTING" / "HSSR_JOINED" EscapedUsername = QuotedString EscapedPassword = QuotedString HSAddress = 16*Base32Character Base32Character = ALPHA / "2" / "3" / "4" / "5" / "6" / "7" TimeCreated = ISOTime2Frac Seconds = 1*DIGIT Microseconds = 1*DIGIT Reason = "NONE" / "TORPROTOCOL" / "INTERNAL" / "REQUESTED" / "HIBERNATING" / "RESOURCELIMIT" / "CONNECTFAILED" / "OR_IDENTITY" / "OR_CONN_CLOSED" / "TIMEOUT" / "FINISHED" / "DESTROYED" / "NOPATH" / "NOSUCHSERVICE" / "MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED" The path is provided only when the circuit has been extended at least one hop. The "BUILD_FLAGS" field is provided only in versions 0.2.3.11-alpha and later. Clients MUST accept build flags not listed above. Build flags are defined as follows: ONEHOP_TUNNEL (one-hop circuit, used for tunneled directory conns) IS_INTERNAL (internal circuit, not to be used for exiting streams) NEED_CAPACITY (this circuit must use only high-capacity nodes) NEED_UPTIME (this circuit must use only high-uptime nodes) The "PURPOSE" field is provided only in versions 0.2.1.6-alpha and later, and only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19). Clients MUST accept purposes not listed above. Purposes are defined as follows: GENERAL (circuit for AP and/or directory request streams) HS_CLIENT_INTRO (HS client-side introduction-point circuit) HS_CLIENT_REND (HS client-side rendezvous circuit; carries AP streams) HS_SERVICE_INTRO (HS service-side introduction-point circuit) HS_SERVICE_REND (HS service-side rendezvous circuit) TESTING (reachability-testing circuit; carries no traffic) CONTROLLER (circuit built by a controller) MEASURE_TIMEOUT (circuit being kept around to see how long it takes) The "HS_STATE" field is provided only for hidden-service circuits, and only in versions 0.2.3.11-alpha and later. Clients MUST accept hidden-service circuit states not listed above. Hidden-service circuit states are defined as follows: HSCI_* (client-side introduction-point circuit states) HSCI_CONNECTING (connecting to intro point) HSCI_INTRO_SENT (sent INTRODUCE1; waiting for reply from IP) HSCI_DONE (received reply from IP relay; closing) HSCR_* (client-side rendezvous-point circuit states) HSCR_CONNECTING (connecting to or waiting for reply from RP) HSCR_ESTABLISHED_IDLE (established RP; waiting for introduction) HSCR_ESTABLISHED_WAITING (introduction sent to HS; waiting for rend) HSCR_JOINED (connected to HS) HSSI_* (service-side introduction-point circuit states) HSSI_CONNECTING (connecting to intro point) HSSI_ESTABLISHED (established intro point) HSSR_* (service-side rendezvous-point circuit states) HSSR_CONNECTING (connecting to client's rend point) HSSR_JOINED (connected to client's RP circuit) The "SOCKS_USERNAME" and "SOCKS_PASSWORD" fields indicate the credentials that were used by a SOCKS client to connect to Tor's SOCKS port and initiate this circuit. (Streams for SOCKS clients connected with different usernames and/or passwords are isolated on separate circuits if the IsolateSOCKSAuth flag is active; see Proposal 171.) The "REND_QUERY" field is provided only for hidden-service-related circuits, and only in versions 0.2.3.11-alpha and later. Clients MUST accept hidden service addresses in formats other than that specified above. The "TIME_CREATED" field is provided only in versions 0.2.3.11-alpha and later. TIME_CREATED is the time at which the circuit was created or cannibalized. The "REASON" field is provided only for FAILED and CLOSED events, and only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19). Clients MUST accept reasons not listed above. Reasons are as given in tor-spec.txt, except for: NOPATH (Not enough nodes to make circuit) MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED (As "TIMEOUT", except that we had left the circuit open for measurement purposes to see how long it would take to finish.) The "REMOTE_REASON" field is provided only when we receive a DESTROY or TRUNCATE cell, and only if extended events are enabled. It contains the actual reason given by the remote OR for closing the circuit. Clients MUST accept reasons not listed above. Reasons are as listed in tor-spec.txt. 4.1.2. Stream status changed The syntax is: "650" SP "STREAM" SP StreamID SP StreamStatus SP CircuitID SP Target [SP "REASON=" Reason [ SP "REMOTE_REASON=" Reason ]] [SP "SOURCE=" Source] [ SP "SOURCE_ADDR=" Address ":" Port ] [SP "PURPOSE=" Purpose] CRLF StreamStatus = "NEW" / ; New request to connect "NEWRESOLVE" / ; New request to resolve an address "REMAP" / ; Address re-mapped to another "SENTCONNECT" / ; Sent a connect cell along a circuit "SENTRESOLVE" / ; Sent a resolve cell along a circuit "SUCCEEDED" / ; Received a reply; stream established "FAILED" / ; Stream failed and not retriable "CLOSED" / ; Stream closed "DETACHED" ; Detached from circuit; still retriable Target = TargetAddress ":" Port Port = an integer from 0 to 65535 inclusive TargetAddress = Address / "(Tor_internal)" The circuit ID designates which circuit this stream is attached to. If the stream is unattached, the circuit ID "0" is given. The target indicates the address which the stream is meant to resolve or connect to; it can be "(Tor_internal)" for a virtual stream created by the Tor program to talk to itself. Reason = "MISC" / "RESOLVEFAILED" / "CONNECTREFUSED" / "EXITPOLICY" / "DESTROY" / "DONE" / "TIMEOUT" / "NOROUTE" / "HIBERNATING" / "INTERNAL"/ "RESOURCELIMIT" / "CONNRESET" / "TORPROTOCOL" / "NOTDIRECTORY" / "END" / "PRIVATE_ADDR" The "REASON" field is provided only for FAILED, CLOSED, and DETACHED events, and only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19). Clients MUST accept reasons not listed above. Reasons are as given in tor-spec.txt, except for: END (We received a RELAY_END cell from the other side of this stream.) PRIVATE_ADDR (The client tried to connect to a private address like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1 over Tor.) [XXXX document more. -NM] The "REMOTE_REASON" field is provided only when we receive a RELAY_END cell, and only if extended events are enabled. It contains the actual reason given by the remote OR for closing the stream. Clients MUST accept reasons not listed above. Reasons are as listed in tor-spec.txt. "REMAP" events include a Source if extended events are enabled: Source = "CACHE" / "EXIT" Clients MUST accept sources not listed above. "CACHE" is given if the Tor client decided to remap the address because of a cached answer, and "EXIT" is given if the remote node we queried gave us the new address as a response. The "SOURCE_ADDR" field is included with NEW and NEWRESOLVE events if extended events are enabled. It indicates the address and port that requested the connection, and can be (e.g.) used to look up the requesting program. Purpose = "DIR_FETCH" / "DIR_UPLOAD" / "DNS_REQUEST" / "USER" / "DIRPORT_TEST" The "PURPOSE" field is provided only for NEW and NEWRESOLVE events, and only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19). Clients MUST accept purposes not listed above. The purposes above are defined as: "DIR_FETCH" -- This stream is generated internally to Tor for fetching directory information. "DIR_UPLOAD" -- An internal stream for uploading information to a directory authority. "DIRPORT_TEST" -- A stream we're using to test our own directory port to make sure it's reachable. "DNS_REQUEST" -- A user-initiated DNS request. "USER" -- This stream is handling user traffic, OR it's internal to Tor, but it doesn't match one of the purposes above. 4.1.3. OR Connection status changed The syntax is: "650" SP "ORCONN" SP (LongName / Target) SP ORStatus [ SP "REASON=" Reason ] [ SP "NCIRCS=" NumCircuits ] [ SP "ID=" ConnID ] CRLF ORStatus = "NEW" / "LAUNCHED" / "CONNECTED" / "FAILED" / "CLOSED" ; In Tor versions 0.1.2.2-alpha through 0.2.2.1-alpha with feature ; VERBOSE_NAMES turned off and before version 0.1.2.2-alpha, OR ; Connection is as follows: "650" SP "ORCONN" SP (ServerID / Target) SP ORStatus [ SP "REASON=" Reason ] [ SP "NCIRCS=" NumCircuits ] CRLF NEW is for incoming connections, and LAUNCHED is for outgoing connections. CONNECTED means the TLS handshake has finished (in either direction). FAILED means a connection is being closed that hasn't finished its handshake, and CLOSED is for connections that have handshaked. A LongName or ServerID is specified unless it's a NEW connection, in which case we don't know what server it is yet, so we use Address:Port. If extended events are enabled (see 3.19), optional reason and circuit counting information is provided for CLOSED and FAILED events. Reason = "MISC" / "DONE" / "CONNECTREFUSED" / "IDENTITY" / "CONNECTRESET" / "TIMEOUT" / "NOROUTE" / "IOERROR" / "RESOURCELIMIT" / "PT_MISSING" NumCircuits counts both established and pending circuits. The ORStatus values are as follows: NEW -- We have received a new incoming OR connection, and are starting the server-side handshake. LAUNCHED -- We have launched a new outgoing OR connection, and are starting the client-side handshake. CONNECTED -- The OR connection has been connected and the handshake is done. FAILED -- Our attempt to open the OR connection failed. CLOSED -- The OR connection closed in an unremarkable way. The Reason values for closed/failed OR connections are: DONE -- The OR connection has shut down cleanly. CONNECTREFUSED -- We got an ECONNREFUSED while connecting to the target OR. IDENTITY -- We connected to the OR, but found that its identity was not what we expected. CONNECTRESET -- We got an ECONNRESET or similar IO error from the connection with the OR. TIMEOUT -- We got an ETIMEOUT or similar IO error from the connection with the OR, or we're closing the connection for being idle for too long. NOROUTE -- We got an ENOTCONN, ENETUNREACH, ENETDOWN, EHOSTUNREACH, or similar error while connecting to the OR. IOERROR -- We got some other IO error on our connection to the OR. RESOURCELIMIT -- We don't have enough operating system resources (file descriptors, buffers, etc) to connect to the OR. PT_MISSING -- No pluggable transport was available. MISC -- The OR connection closed for some other reason. [First added ID parameter in 0.2.5.2-alpha] 4.1.4. Bandwidth used in the last second The syntax is: "650" SP "BW" SP BytesRead SP BytesWritten *(SP Type "=" Num) CRLF BytesRead = 1*DIGIT BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT Type = "DIR" / "OR" / "EXIT" / "APP" / ... Num = 1*DIGIT BytesRead and BytesWritten are the totals. [In a future Tor version, we may also include a breakdown of the connection types that used bandwidth this second (not implemented yet).] 4.1.5. Log messages The syntax is: "650" SP Severity SP ReplyText CRLF or "650+" Severity CRLF Data 650 SP "OK" CRLF Severity = "DEBUG" / "INFO" / "NOTICE" / "WARN"/ "ERR" 4.1.6. New descriptors available Syntax: "650" SP "NEWDESC" 1*(SP LongName) CRLF ; In Tor versions 0.1.2.2-alpha through 0.2.2.1-alpha with feature ; VERBOSE_NAMES turned off and before version 0.1.2.2-alpha, it ; is as follows: "650" SP "NEWDESC" 1*(SP ServerID) CRLF 4.1.7. New Address mapping These events are generated when a new address mapping is entered in Tor's address map cache, or when the answer for a RESOLVE command is found. Entries can be created by a successful or failed DNS lookup, a successful or failed connection attempt, a RESOLVE command, a MAPADDRESS command, the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, or the TrackHostExits feature. Syntax: "650" SP "ADDRMAP" SP Address SP NewAddress SP Expiry [SP "error=" ErrorCode] [SP "EXPIRES=" UTCExpiry] [SP "CACHED=" Cached] CRLF NewAddress = Address / "" Expiry = DQUOTE ISOTime DQUOTE / "NEVER" ErrorCode = "yes" / "internal" / "Unable to launch resolve request" UTCExpiry = DQUOTE IsoTime DQUOTE Cached = DQUOTE "YES" DQUOTE / DQUOTE "NO" DQUOTE Error and UTCExpiry are only provided if extended events are enabled. The values for Error are mostly useless. Future values will be chosen to match 1*(ALNUM / "_"); the "Unable to launch resolve request" value is a bug in Tor before 0.2.4.7-alpha. Expiry is expressed as the local time (rather than UTC). This is a bug, left in for backward compatibility; new code should look at UTCExpiry instead. (If Expiry is "NEVER", UTCExpiry is omitted.) Cached indicates whether the mapping will be stored until it expires, or if it is just a notification in response to a RESOLVE command. 4.1.8. Descriptors uploaded to us in our role as authoritative dirserver Tor generates this event when it's an directory authority, and somebody has just uploaded a server descriptor. Syntax: "650" "+" "AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS" CRLF Action CRLF Message CRLF Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF Action = "ACCEPTED" / "DROPPED" / "REJECTED" Message = Text The Descriptor field is the text of the server descriptor; the Action field is "ACCEPTED" if we're accepting the descriptor as the new best valid descriptor for its router, "REJECTED" if we aren't taking the descriptor and we're complaining to the uploading relay about it, and "DROPPED" if we decide to drop the descriptor without complaining. The Message field is a human-readable string explaining why we chose the Action. (It doesn't contain newlines.) 4.1.9. Our descriptor changed Syntax: "650" SP "DESCCHANGED" CRLF [First added in 0.1.2.2-alpha.] 4.1.10. Status events Status events (STATUS_GENERAL, STATUS_CLIENT, and STATUS_SERVER) are sent based on occurrences in the Tor process pertaining to the general state of the program. Generally, they correspond to log messages of severity Notice or higher. They differ from log messages in that their format is a specified interface. Syntax: "650" SP StatusType SP StatusSeverity SP StatusAction [SP StatusArguments] CRLF StatusType = "STATUS_GENERAL" / "STATUS_CLIENT" / "STATUS_SERVER" StatusSeverity = "NOTICE" / "WARN" / "ERR" StatusAction = 1*ALPHA StatusArguments = StatusArgument *(SP StatusArgument) StatusArgument = StatusKeyword '=' StatusValue StatusKeyword = 1*(ALNUM / "_") StatusValue = 1*(ALNUM / '_') / QuotedString StatusAction is a string, and StatusArguments is a series of keyword=value pairs on the same line. Values may be space-terminated strings, or quoted strings. These events are always produced with EXTENDED_EVENTS and VERBOSE_NAMES; see the explanations in the USEFEATURE section for details. Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized actions, MUST tolerate unrecognized arguments, MUST tolerate missing arguments, and MUST tolerate arguments that arrive in any order. Each event description below is accompanied by a recommendation for controllers. These recommendations are suggestions only; no controller is required to implement them. Compatibility note: versions of Tor before 0.2.0.22-rc incorrectly generated "STATUS_SERVER" as "STATUS_SEVER". To be compatible with those versions, tools should accept both. Actions for STATUS_GENERAL events can be as follows: CLOCK_JUMPED "TIME=NUM" Tor spent enough time without CPU cycles that it has closed all its circuits and will establish them anew. This typically happens when a laptop goes to sleep and then wakes up again. It also happens when the system is swapping so heavily that Tor is starving. The "time" argument specifies the number of seconds Tor thinks it was unconscious for (or alternatively, the number of seconds it went back in time). This status event is sent as NOTICE severity normally, but WARN severity if Tor is acting as a server currently. {Recommendation for controller: ignore it, since we don't really know what the user should do anyway. Hm.} DANGEROUS_VERSION "CURRENT=version" "REASON=NEW/OBSOLETE/UNRECOMMENDED" "RECOMMENDED=\"version, version, ...\"" Tor has found that directory servers don't recommend its version of the Tor software. RECOMMENDED is a comma-and-space-separated string of Tor versions that are recommended. REASON is NEW if this version of Tor is newer than any recommended version, OBSOLETE if this version of Tor is older than any recommended version, and UNRECOMMENDED if some recommended versions of Tor are newer and some are older than this version. (The "OBSOLETE" reason was called "OLD" from Tor 0.1.2.3-alpha up to and including 0.2.0.12-alpha.) {Controllers may want to suggest that the user upgrade OLD or UNRECOMMENDED versions. NEW versions may be known-insecure, or may simply be development versions.} TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS "CURRENT=NUM" Tor has reached its ulimit -n or whatever the native limit is on file descriptors or sockets. CURRENT is the number of sockets Tor currently has open. The user should really do something about this. The "current" argument shows the number of connections currently open. {Controllers may recommend that the user increase the limit, or increase it for them. Recommendations should be phrased in an OS-appropriate way and automated when possible.} BUG "REASON=STRING" Tor has encountered a situation that its developers never expected, and the developers would like to learn that it happened. Perhaps the controller can explain this to the user and encourage her to file a bug report? {Controllers should log bugs, but shouldn't annoy the user in case a bug appears frequently.} CLOCK_SKEW SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS MIN_SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS. SOURCE="DIRSERV:" IP ":" Port / "NETWORKSTATUS:" IP ":" Port / "OR:" IP ":" Port / "CONSENSUS" If "SKEW" is present, it's an estimate of how far we are from the time declared in the source. (In other words, if we're an hour in the past, the value is -3600.) "MIN_SKEW" is present, it's a lower bound. If the source is a DIRSERV, we got the current time from a connection to a dirserver. If the source is a NETWORKSTATUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a v2 networkstatus from far in the future. If the source is OR, the skew comes from a NETINFO cell from a connection to another relay. If the source is CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a networkstatus consensus from the future. {Tor should send this message to controllers when it thinks the skew is so high that it will interfere with proper Tor operation. Controllers shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more accurate source of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently unauthenticated.} BAD_LIBEVENT "METHOD=" libevent method "VERSION=" libevent version "BADNESS=" "BROKEN" / "BUGGY" / "SLOW" "RECOVERED=" "NO" / "YES" Tor knows about bugs in using the configured event method in this version of libevent. "BROKEN" libevents won't work at all; "BUGGY" libevents might work okay; "SLOW" libevents will work fine, but not quickly. If "RECOVERED" is YES, Tor managed to switch to a more reliable (but probably slower!) libevent method. {Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs, though generally it's the fault of whoever built the Tor binary and there's not much the user can do besides upgrade libevent or upgrade the binary.} DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE Tor believes that none of the known directory servers are reachable -- this is most likely because the local network is down or otherwise not working, and might help to explain for the user why Tor appears to be broken. {Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs; further action is generally not possible.} CONSENSUS_ARRIVED Tor has received and validated a new consensus networkstatus. (This event can be delayed a little while after the consensus is received, if Tor needs to fetch certificates.) Actions for STATUS_CLIENT events can be as follows: BOOTSTRAP "PROGRESS=" num "TAG=" Keyword "SUMMARY=" String ["WARNING=" String] ["REASON=" Keyword] ["COUNT=" num] ["RECOMMENDATION=" Keyword] ["HOST=" QuotedString] ["HOSTADDR=" QuotedString] Tor has made some progress at establishing a connection to the Tor network, fetching directory information, or making its first circuit; or it has encountered a problem while bootstrapping. This status event is especially useful for users with slow connections or with connectivity problems. "Progress" gives a number between 0 and 100 for how far through the bootstrapping process we are. "Summary" is a string that can be displayed to the user to describe the *next* task that Tor will tackle, i.e., the task it is working on after sending the status event. "Tag" is a string that controllers can use to recognize bootstrap phases, if they want to do something smarter than just blindly displaying the summary string; see Section 5 for the current tags that Tor issues. The StatusSeverity describes whether this is a normal bootstrap phase (severity notice) or an indication of a bootstrapping problem (severity warn). For bootstrap problems, we include the same progress, tag, and summary values as we would for a normal bootstrap event, but we also include "warning", "reason", "count", and "recommendation" key/value combos. The "count" number tells how many bootstrap problems there have been so far at this phase. The "reason" string lists one of the reasons allowed in the ORCONN event. The "warning" argument string with any hints Tor has to offer about why it's having troubles bootstrapping. The "reason" values are long-term-stable controller-facing tags to identify particular issues in a bootstrapping step. The warning strings, on the other hand, are human-readable. Controllers SHOULD NOT rely on the format of any warning string. Currently the possible values for "recommendation" are either "ignore" or "warn" -- if ignore, the controller can accumulate the string in a pile of problems to show the user if the user asks; if warn, the controller should alert the user that Tor is pretty sure there's a bootstrapping problem. The "host" value is the identity digest (in hex) of the node we're trying to connect to; the "hostaddr" is an address:port combination, where 'address' is an ipv4 or ipv6 address. Currently Tor uses recommendation=ignore for the first nine bootstrap problem reports for a given phase, and then uses recommendation=warn for subsequent problems at that phase. Hopefully this is a good balance between tolerating occasional errors and reporting serious problems quickly. ENOUGH_DIR_INFO Tor now knows enough network-status documents and enough server descriptors that it's going to start trying to build circuits now. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both exit and internal circuits. If not, Tor will only build internal circuits.] {Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing to tell them so.} NOT_ENOUGH_DIR_INFO We discarded expired statuses and server descriptors to fall below the desired threshold of directory information. We won't try to build any circuits until ENOUGH_DIR_INFO occurs again. {Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing to tell them so.} CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED Tor is able to establish circuits for client use. This event will only be sent if we just built a circuit that changed our mind -- that is, prior to this event we didn't know whether we could establish circuits. {Suggested use: controllers can notify their users that Tor is ready for use as a client once they see this status event. [Perhaps controllers should also have a timeout if too much time passes and this event hasn't arrived, to give tips on how to troubleshoot. On the other hand, hopefully Tor will send further status events if it can identify the problem.]} CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED "REASON=" "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" / "DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE" / "CLOCK_JUMPED" We are no longer confident that we can build circuits. The "reason" keyword provides an explanation: which other status event type caused our lack of confidence. {Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing to do so.} [Note: only REASON=CLOCK_JUMPED is implemented currently.] DANGEROUS_PORT "PORT=" port "RESULT=" "REJECT" / "WARN" A stream was initiated to a port that's commonly used for vulnerable-plaintext protocols. If the Result is "reject", we refused the connection; whereas if it's "warn", we allowed it. {Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle). They might also want some sort of interface to let the user configure their RejectPlaintextPorts and WarnPlaintextPorts config options.} DANGEROUS_SOCKS "PROTOCOL=" "SOCKS4" / "SOCKS5" "ADDRESS=" IP:port A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port using one of the SOCKS approaches that doesn't support hostnames -- only raw IP addresses. If the client application got this address from gethostbyname(), it may be leaking target addresses via DNS. {Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle).} SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL "DATA=string" A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port that tried to use it for something other than the SOCKS protocol. Perhaps the user is using Tor as an HTTP proxy? The DATA is the first few characters sent to Tor on the SOCKS port. {Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it indicates a misconfigured application.} SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME "HOSTNAME=QuotedString" Some application gave us a funny-looking hostname. Perhaps it is broken? In any case it won't work with Tor and the user should know. {Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it usually indicates a misconfigured application.} Actions for STATUS_SERVER can be as follows: EXTERNAL_ADDRESS "ADDRESS=IP" "HOSTNAME=NAME" "METHOD=CONFIGURED/DIRSERV/RESOLVED/INTERFACE/GETHOSTNAME" Our best idea for our externally visible IP has changed to 'IP'. If 'HOSTNAME' is present, we got the new IP by resolving 'NAME'. If the method is 'CONFIGURED', the IP was given verbatim as a configuration option. If the method is 'RESOLVED', we resolved the Address configuration option to get the IP. If the method is 'GETHOSTNAME', we resolved our hostname to get the IP. If the method is 'INTERFACE', we got the address of one of our network interfaces to get the IP. If the method is 'DIRSERV', a directory server told us a guess for what our IP might be. {Controllers may want to record this info and display it to the user.} CHECKING_REACHABILITY "ORADDRESS=IP:port" "DIRADDRESS=IP:port" We're going to start testing the reachability of our external OR port or directory port. {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.} REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED "ORADDRESS=IP:port" "DIRADDRESS=IP:port" We successfully verified the reachability of our external OR port or directory port (depending on which of ORADDRESS or DIRADDRESS is given.) {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.} GOOD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR We successfully uploaded our server descriptor to at least one of the directory authorities, with no complaints. {Originally, the goal of this event was to declare "every authority has accepted the descriptor, so there will be no complaints about it." But since some authorities might be offline, it's harder to get certainty than we had thought. As such, this event is equivalent to ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR below. Controllers should just look at ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR and should ignore this event for now.} SERVER_DESCRIPTOR_STATUS "STATUS=" "LISTED" / "UNLISTED" We just got a new networkstatus consensus, and whether we're in it or not in it has changed. Specifically, status is "listed" if we're listed in it but previous to this point we didn't know we were listed in a consensus; and status is "unlisted" if we thought we should have been listed in it (e.g. we were listed in the last one), but we're not. {Moving from listed to unlisted is not necessarily cause for alarm. The relay might have failed a few reachability tests, or the Internet might have had some routing problems. So this feature is mainly to let relay operators know when their relay has successfully been listed in the consensus.} [Not implemented yet. We should do this in 0.2.2.x. -RD] NAMESERVER_STATUS "NS=addr" "STATUS=" "UP" / "DOWN" "ERR=" message One of our nameservers has changed status. {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.} NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN All of our nameservers have gone down. {This is a problem; if it happens often without the nameservers coming up again, the user needs to configure more or better nameservers.} DNS_HIJACKED Our DNS provider is providing an address when it should be saying "NOTFOUND"; Tor will treat the address as a synonym for "NOTFOUND". {This is an annoyance; controllers may want to tell admins that their DNS provider is not to be trusted.} DNS_USELESS Our DNS provider is giving a hijacked address instead of well-known websites; Tor will not try to be an exit node. {Controllers could warn the admin if the relay is running as an exit node: the admin needs to configure a good DNS server. Alternatively, this happens a lot in some restrictive environments (hotels, universities, coffeeshops) when the user hasn't registered.} BAD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR "DIRAUTH=addr:port" "REASON=string" A directory authority rejected our descriptor. Possible reasons include malformed descriptors, incorrect keys, highly skewed clocks, and so on. {Controllers should warn the admin, and try to cope if they can.} ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR "DIRAUTH=addr:port" A single directory authority accepted our descriptor. // actually notice {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.} REACHABILITY_FAILED "ORADDRESS=IP:port" "DIRADDRESS=IP:port" We failed to connect to our external OR port or directory port successfully. {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status. The controller should warn the admin and suggest reasonable steps to take.} HIBERNATION_STATUS "STATUS=" "AWAKE" | "SOFT" | "HARD" Our bandwidth based accounting status has changed, and we are now relaying traffic/rejecting new connections/hibernating. {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status. The controller MAY inform the admin, though presumably the accounting was explicitly enabled for a reason.} [This event was added in tor 0.2.9.0-alpha.] 4.1.11. Our set of guard nodes has changed Syntax: "650" SP "GUARD" SP Type SP Name SP Status ... CRLF Type = "ENTRY" Name = ServerSpec (Identifies the guard affected) Status = "NEW" | "UP" | "DOWN" | "BAD" | "GOOD" | "DROPPED" The ENTRY type indicates a guard used for connections to the Tor network. The Status values are: "NEW" -- This node was not previously used as a guard; now we have picked it as one. "DROPPED" -- This node is one we previously picked as a guard; we no longer consider it to be a member of our guard list. "UP" -- The guard now seems to be reachable. "DOWN" -- The guard now seems to be unreachable. "BAD" -- Because of flags set in the consensus and/or values in the configuration, this node is now unusable as a guard. "GOOD" -- Because of flags set in the consensus and/or values in the configuration, this node is now usable as a guard. Controllers must accept unrecognized types and unrecognized statuses. 4.1.12. Network status has changed Syntax: "650" "+" "NS" CRLF 1*NetworkStatus "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF The event is used whenever our local view of a relay status changes. This happens when we get a new v3 consensus (in which case the entries we see are a duplicate of what we see in the NEWCONSENSUS event, below), but it also happens when we decide to mark a relay as up or down in our local status, for example based on connection attempts. [First added in 0.1.2.3-alpha] 4.1.13. Bandwidth used on an application stream The syntax is: "650" SP "STREAM_BW" SP StreamID SP BytesWritten SP BytesRead CRLF BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT BytesRead = 1*DIGIT BytesWritten and BytesRead are the number of bytes written and read by the application since the last STREAM_BW event on this stream. Note that from Tor's perspective, *reading* a byte on a stream means that the application *wrote* the byte. That's why the order of "written" vs "read" is opposite for stream_bw events compared to bw events. These events are generated about once per second per stream; no events are generated for streams that have not written or read. These events apply only to streams entering Tor (such as on a SOCKSPort, TransPort, or so on). They are not generated for exiting streams. 4.1.14. Per-country client stats The syntax is: "650" SP "CLIENTS_SEEN" SP TimeStarted SP CountrySummary SP IPVersions CRLF We just generated a new summary of which countries we've seen clients from recently. The controller could display this for the user, e.g. in their "relay" configuration window, to give them a sense that they are actually being useful. Currently only bridge relays will receive this event, but once we figure out how to sufficiently aggregate and sanitize the client counts on main relays, we might start sending these events in other cases too. TimeStarted is a quoted string indicating when the reported summary counts from (in UTCS). The CountrySummary keyword has as its argument a comma-separated, possibly empty set of "countrycode=count" pairs. For example (without linebreak), 650-CLIENTS_SEEN TimeStarted="2008-12-25 23:50:43" CountrySummary=us=16,de=8,uk=8 The IPVersions keyword has as its argument a comma-separated set of "protocol-family=count" pairs. For example, IPVersions=v4=16,v6=40 Note that these values are rounded, not exact. The rounding algorithm is specified in the description of "geoip-client-origins" in dir-spec.txt. 4.1.15. New consensus networkstatus has arrived The syntax is: "650" "+" "NEWCONSENSUS" CRLF 1*NetworkStatus "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF A new consensus networkstatus has arrived. We include NS-style lines for every relay in the consensus. NEWCONSENSUS is a separate event from the NS event, because the list here represents every usable relay: so any relay *not* mentioned in this list is implicitly no longer recommended. [First added in 0.2.1.13-alpha] 4.1.16. New circuit buildtime has been set The syntax is: "650" SP "BUILDTIMEOUT_SET" SP Type SP "TOTAL_TIMES=" Total SP "TIMEOUT_MS=" Timeout SP "XM=" Xm SP "ALPHA=" Alpha SP "CUTOFF_QUANTILE=" Quantile SP "TIMEOUT_RATE=" TimeoutRate SP "CLOSE_MS=" CloseTimeout SP "CLOSE_RATE=" CloseRate CRLF Type = "COMPUTED" / "RESET" / "SUSPENDED" / "DISCARD" / "RESUME" Total = Integer count of timeouts stored Timeout = Integer timeout in milliseconds Xm = Estimated integer Pareto parameter Xm in milliseconds Alpha = Estimated floating point Paredo paremter alpha Quantile = Floating point CDF quantile cutoff point for this timeout TimeoutRate = Floating point ratio of circuits that timeout CloseTimeout = How long to keep measurement circs in milliseconds CloseRate = Floating point ratio of measurement circuits that are closed A new circuit build timeout time has been set. If Type is "COMPUTED", Tor has computed the value based on historical data. If Type is "RESET", initialization or drastic network changes have caused Tor to reset the timeout back to the default, to relearn again. If Type is "SUSPENDED", Tor has detected a loss of network connectivity and has temporarily changed the timeout value to the default until the network recovers. If type is "DISCARD", Tor has decided to discard timeout values that likely happened while the network was down. If type is "RESUME", Tor has decided to resume timeout calculation. The Total value is the count of circuit build times Tor used in computing this value. It is capped internally at the maximum number of build times Tor stores (NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE). The Timeout itself is provided in milliseconds. Internally, Tor rounds this value to the nearest second before using it. [First added in 0.2.2.7-alpha] 4.1.17. Signal received The syntax is: "650" SP "SIGNAL" SP Signal CRLF Signal = "RELOAD" / "DUMP" / "DEBUG" / "NEWNYM" / "CLEARDNSCACHE" A signal has been received and actions taken by Tor. The meaning of each signal, and the mapping to Unix signals, is as defined in section 3.7. Future versions of Tor MAY generate signals other than those listed here; controllers MUST be able to accept them. If Tor chose to ignore a signal (such as NEWNYM), this event will not be sent. Note that some options (like ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP) may affect the semantics of the signals here. Note that the HALT (SIGTERM) and SHUTDOWN (SIGINT) signals do not currently generate any event. [First added in 0.2.3.1-alpha] 4.1.18. Configuration changed The syntax is: StartReplyLine *(MidReplyLine) EndReplyLine StartReplyLine = "650-CONF_CHANGED" CRLF MidReplyLine = "650-" KEYWORD ["=" VALUE] CRLF EndReplyLine = "650 OK" Tor configuration options have changed (such as via a SETCONF or RELOAD signal). KEYWORD and VALUE specify the configuration option that was changed. Undefined configuration options contain only the KEYWORD. 4.1.19. Circuit status changed slightly The syntax is: "650" SP "CIRC_MINOR" SP CircuitID SP CircEvent [SP Path] [SP "BUILD_FLAGS=" BuildFlags] [SP "PURPOSE=" Purpose] [SP "HS_STATE=" HSState] [SP "REND_QUERY=" HSAddress] [SP "TIME_CREATED=" TimeCreated] [SP "OLD_PURPOSE=" Purpose [SP "OLD_HS_STATE=" HSState]] CRLF CircEvent = "PURPOSE_CHANGED" / ; circuit purpose or HS-related state changed "CANNIBALIZED" ; circuit cannibalized Clients MUST accept circuit events not listed above. The "OLD_PURPOSE" field is provided for both PURPOSE_CHANGED and CANNIBALIZED events. The "OLD_HS_STATE" field is provided whenever the "OLD_PURPOSE" field is provided and is a hidden-service-related purpose. Other fields are as specified in section 4.1.1 above. [First added in 0.2.3.11-alpha] 4.1.20. Pluggable transport launched The syntax is: "650" SP "TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED" SP Type SP Name SP TransportAddress SP Port Type = "server" | "client" Name = The name of the pluggable transport TransportAddress = An IPv4 or IPv6 address on which the pluggable transport is listening for connections Port = The TCP port on which it is listening for connections. A pluggable transport called 'Name' of type 'Type' was launched successfully and is now listening for connections on 'Address':'Port'. 4.1.21. Bandwidth used on an OR or DIR or EXIT connection The syntax is: "650" SP "CONN_BW" SP "ID=" ConnID SP "TYPE=" ConnType SP "READ=" BytesRead SP "WRITTEN=" BytesWritten CRLF ConnType = "OR" / ; Carrying traffic within the tor network. This can either be our own (client) traffic or traffic we're relaying within the network. "DIR" / ; Fetching tor descriptor data, or transmitting descriptors we're mirroring. "EXIT" ; Carrying traffic between the tor network and an external destination. BytesRead = 1*DIGIT BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized connection types. BytesWritten and BytesRead are the number of bytes written and read by Tor since the last CONN_BW event on this connection. These events are generated about once per second per connection; no events are generated for connections that have not read or written. These events are only generated if TestingTorNetwork is set. [First added in 0.2.5.2-alpha] 4.1.22. Bandwidth used by all streams attached to a circuit The syntax is: "650" SP "CIRC_BW" SP "ID=" CircuitID SP "READ=" BytesRead SP "WRITTEN=" BytesWritten CRLF BytesRead = 1*DIGIT BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT BytesRead and BytesWritten are the number of bytes read and written by all applications with streams attached to this circuit since the last CIRC_BW event. These events are generated about once per second per circuit; no events are generated for circuits that had no attached stream writing or reading. [First added in 0.2.5.2-alpha] 4.1.23. Per-circuit cell stats The syntax is: "650" SP "CELL_STATS" [ SP "ID=" CircuitID ] [ SP "InboundQueue=" QueueID SP "InboundConn=" ConnID ] [ SP "InboundAdded=" CellsByType ] [ SP "InboundRemoved=" CellsByType SP "InboundTime=" MsecByType ] [ SP "OutboundQueue=" QueueID SP "OutboundConn=" ConnID ] [ SP "OutboundAdded=" CellsByType ] [ SP "OutboundRemoved=" CellsByType SP "OutboundTime=" MsecByType ] CRLF CellsByType, MsecByType = CellType ":" 1*DIGIT 0*( "," CellType ":" 1*DIGIT ) CellType = 1*( "a" - "z" / "0" - "9" / "_" ) Examples are: 650 CELL_STATS ID=14 OutboundQueue=19403 OutboundConn=15 OutboundAdded=create_fast:1,relay_early:2 OutboundRemoved=create_fast:1,relay_early:2 OutboundTime=create_fast:0,relay_early:0 650 CELL_STATS InboundQueue=19403 InboundConn=32 InboundAdded=relay:1,created_fast:1 InboundRemoved=relay:1,created_fast:1 InboundTime=relay:0,created_fast:0 OutboundQueue=6710 OutboundConn=18 OutboundAdded=create:1,relay_early:1 OutboundRemoved=create:1,relay_early:1 OutboundTime=create:0,relay_early:0 ID is the locally unique circuit identifier that is only included if the circuit originates at this node. Inbound and outbound refer to the direction of cell flow through the circuit which is either to origin (inbound) or from origin (outbound). InboundQueue and OutboundQueue are identifiers of the inbound and outbound circuit queues of this circuit. These identifiers are only unique per OR connection. OutboundQueue is chosen by this node and matches InboundQueue of the next node in the circuit. InboundConn and OutboundConn are locally unique IDs of inbound and outbound OR connection. OutboundConn does not necessarily match InboundConn of the next node in the circuit. InboundQueue and InboundConn are not present if the circuit originates at this node. OutboundQueue and OutboundConn are not present if the circuit (currently) ends at this node. InboundAdded and OutboundAdded are total number of cells by cell type added to inbound and outbound queues. Only present if at least one cell was added to a queue. InboundRemoved and OutboundRemoved are total number of cells by cell type processed from inbound and outbound queues. InboundTime and OutboundTime are total waiting times in milliseconds of all processed cells by cell type. Only present if at least one cell was removed from a queue. These events are generated about once per second per circuit; no events are generated for circuits that have not added or processed any cell. These events are only generated if TestingTorNetwork is set. [First added in 0.2.5.2-alpha] 4.1.24. Token buckets refilled The syntax is: "650" SP "TB_EMPTY" SP BucketName [ SP "ID=" ConnID ] SP "READ=" ReadBucketEmpty SP "WRITTEN=" WriteBucketEmpty SP "LAST=" LastRefill CRLF BucketName = "GLOBAL" / "RELAY" / "ORCONN" ReadBucketEmpty = 1*DIGIT WriteBucketEmpty = 1*DIGIT LastRefill = 1*DIGIT Examples are: 650 TB_EMPTY ORCONN ID=16 READ=0 WRITTEN=0 LAST=100 650 TB_EMPTY GLOBAL READ=93 WRITTEN=93 LAST=100 650 TB_EMPTY RELAY READ=93 WRITTEN=93 LAST=100 This event is generated when refilling a previously empty token bucket. BucketNames "GLOBAL" and "RELAY" keywords are used for the global or relay token buckets, BucketName "ORCONN" is used for the token buckets of an OR connection. Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized bucket names. ConnID is only included if the BucketName is "ORCONN". If both global and relay buckets and/or the buckets of one or more OR connections run out of tokens at the same time, multiple separate events are generated. ReadBucketEmpty (WriteBucketEmpty) is the time in millis that the read (write) bucket was empty since the last refill. LastRefill is the time in millis since the last refill. If a bucket went negative and if refilling tokens didn't make it go positive again, there will be multiple consecutive TB_EMPTY events for each refill interval during which the bucket contained zero tokens or less. In such a case, ReadBucketEmpty or WriteBucketEmpty are capped at LastRefill in order not to report empty times more than once. These events are only generated if TestingTorNetwork is set. [First added in 0.2.5.2-alpha] 4.1.25. HiddenService descriptors The syntax is: "650" SP "HS_DESC" SP Action SP HSAddress SP AuthType SP HsDir [SP DescriptorID] [SP "REASON=" Reason] [SP "REPLICA=" Replica] Action = "REQUESTED" / "UPLOAD" / "RECEIVED" / "UPLOADED" / "IGNORE" / "FAILED" / "CREATED" HSAddress = 16*Base32Character / "UNKNOWN" AuthType = "NO_AUTH" / "BASIC_AUTH" / "STEALTH_AUTH" / "UNKNOWN" HsDir = LongName / Fingerprint / "UNKNOWN" DescriptorID = 32*Base32Character Reason = "BAD_DESC" / "QUERY_REJECTED" / "UPLOAD_REJECTED" / "NOT_FOUND" / "UNEXPECTED" / "QUERY_NO_HSDIR" Replica = 1*DIGIT These events will be triggered when required HiddenService descriptor is not found in the cache and a fetch or upload with the network is performed. If the fetch was triggered with only a DescriptorID (using the HSFETCH command for instance), the HSAddress only appears in the Action=RECEIVED since there is no way to know the HSAddress from the DescriptorID thus the value will be "UNKNOWN". If we already had the v0 descriptor, the newly fetched v2 descriptor will be ignored and a "HS_DESC" event with "IGNORE" action will be generated. For HsDir, LongName is always prefered. If HsDir cannot be found in node list at the time event is sent, Fingerprint will be used instead. If Action is "FAILED", Tor SHOULD send Reason field as well. Possible values of Reason are: - "BAD_DESC" - descriptor was retrieved, but found to be unparsable. - "QUERY_REJECTED" - query was rejected by HS directory. - "UPLOAD_REJECTED" - descriptor was rejected by HS directory. - "NOT_FOUND" - HS descriptor with given identifier was not found. - "UNEXPECTED" - nature of failure is unknown. - "QUERY_NO_HSDIR" - No suitable HSDir were found for the query. For "QUERY_NO_HSDIR", the HsDir will be set to "UNKNOWN" which was introduced in tor 0.3.1.0-alpha. If Action is "CREATED", Tor SHOULD send Replica field as well. The Replica field contains the replica number of the generated descriptor. The Replica number is specified in rend-spec.txt section 1.3 and determines the descriptor ID of the descriptor. 4.1.26. HiddenService descriptors content The syntax is: "650" "+" "HS_DESC_CONTENT" SP HSAddress SP DescId SP HsDir CRLF Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF HSAddress = 16*Base32Character / "UNKNOWN" DescId = 32*Base32Character HsDir = LongName / "UNKNOWN" Descriptor = The text of the descriptor formatted as specified in rend-spec.txt section 1.3 or empty string on failure. This event is triggered when a successfully fetched HS descriptor is received. The text of that descriptor is then replied. If the HS_DESC event is enabled, it is replied just after the RECEIVED action. If a fetch fails, the Descriptor is an empty string and HSAddress is set to "UNKNOWN". The HS_DESC event should be used to get more information on the failed request. If the fetch fails for the QUERY_NO_HSDIR reason from the HS_DESC event, the HsDir is set to "UNKNOWN". This was introduced in 0.3.1.0-alpha. It's expected to receive a reply relatively fast as in it's the time it takes to fetch something over the Tor network. This can be between a couple of seconds up to 60 seconds (not a hard limit). But, in any cases, this event will reply either the descriptor's content or an empty one. [HS_DESC_CONTENT was added in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha] 4.1.27. Network liveness has changed Syntax: "650" SP "NETWORK_LIVENESS" SP Status CRLF Status = "UP" / ; The network now seems to be reachable. "DOWN" / ; The network now seems to be unreachable. Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized status types. [NETWORK_LIVENESS was added in Tor 0.2.7.2-alpha] 5. Implementation notes 5.1. Authentication If the control port is open and no authentication operation is enabled, Tor trusts any local user that connects to the control port. This is generally a poor idea. If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic cookie" file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory (or to another file specified in the 'CookieAuthFile' option). To authenticate, the controller must demonstrate that it can read the contents of the cookie file: * Current versions of Tor support cookie authentication using the "COOKIE" authentication method: the controller sends the contents of the cookie file, encoded in hexadecimal. This authentication method exposes the user running a controller to an unintended information disclosure attack whenever the controller has greater filesystem read access than the process that it has connected to. (Note that a controller may connect to a process other than Tor.) It is almost never safe to use, even if the controller's user has explicitly specified which filename to read an authentication cookie from. For this reason, the COOKIE authentication method has been deprecated and will be removed from Tor before some future version of Tor. * 0.2.2.x versions of Tor starting with 0.2.2.36, and all versions of Tor after 0.2.3.12-alpha, support cookie authentication using the "SAFECOOKIE" authentication method, which discloses much less information about the contents of the cookie file. If the 'HashedControlPassword' option is set, it must contain the salted hash of a secret password. The salted hash is computed according to the S2K algorithm in RFC 2440 (OpenPGP), and prefixed with the s2k specifier. This is then encoded in hexadecimal, prefixed by the indicator sequence "16:". Thus, for example, the password 'foo' could encode to: 16:660537E3E1CD49996044A3BF558097A981F539FEA2F9DA662B4626C1C2 ++++++++++++++++**^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ salt hashed value indicator You can generate the salt of a password by calling 'tor --hash-password ' or by using the example code in the Python and Java controller libraries. To authenticate under this scheme, the controller sends Tor the original secret that was used to generate the password, either as a quoted string or encoded in hexadecimal. 5.2. Don't let the buffer get too big. If you ask for lots of events, and 16MB of them queue up on the buffer, the Tor process will close the socket. 5.3. Backward compatibility with v0 control protocol. The 'version 0' control protocol was replaced in Tor 0.1.1.x. Support was removed in Tor 0.2.0.x. Every non-obsolete version of Tor now supports the version 1 control protocol. For backward compatibility with the "version 0" control protocol, Tor used to check whether the third octet of the first command is zero. (If it was, Tor assumed that version 0 is in use.) This compatibility was removed in Tor 0.1.2.16 and 0.2.0.4-alpha. 5.4. Tor config options for use by controllers Tor provides a few special configuration options for use by controllers. These options can be set and examined by the SETCONF and GETCONF commands, but are not saved to disk by SAVECONF. Generally, these options make Tor unusable by disabling a portion of Tor's normal operations. Unless a controller provides replacement functionality to fill this gap, Tor will not correctly handle user requests. __AllDirActionsPrivate If true, Tor will try to launch all directory operations through anonymous connections. (Ordinarily, Tor only tries to anonymize requests related to hidden services.) This option will slow down directory access, and may stop Tor from working entirely if it does not yet have enough directory information to build circuits. (Boolean. Default: "0".) __DisablePredictedCircuits If true, Tor will not launch preemptive "general-purpose" circuits for streams to attach to. (It will still launch circuits for testing and for hidden services.) (Boolean. Default: "0".) __LeaveStreamsUnattached If true, Tor will not automatically attach new streams to circuits; instead, the controller must attach them with ATTACHSTREAM. If the controller does not attach the streams, their data will never be routed. (Boolean. Default: "0".) __HashedControlSessionPassword As HashedControlPassword, but is not saved to the torrc file by SAVECONF. Added in Tor 0.2.0.20-rc. __ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP If this option is true (the default), we reload the torrc from disk every time we get a SIGHUP (from the controller or via a signal). Otherwise, we don't. This option exists so that controllers can keep their options from getting overwritten when a user sends Tor a HUP for some other reason (for example, to rotate the logs). (Boolean. Default: "1") __OwningControllerProcess If this option is set to a process ID, Tor will periodically check whether a process with the specified PID exists, and exit if one does not. Added in Tor 0.2.2.28-beta. This option's intended use is documented in section 3.23 with the related TAKEOWNERSHIP command. Note that this option can only specify a single process ID, unlike the TAKEOWNERSHIP command which can be sent along multiple control connections. (String. Default: unset.) 5.5. Phases from the Bootstrap status event. This section describes the various bootstrap phases currently reported by Tor. Controllers should not assume that the percentages and tags listed here will continue to match up, or even that the tags will stay in the same order. Some phases might also be skipped (not reported) if the associated bootstrap step is already complete, or if the phase no longer is necessary. Only "starting" and "done" are guaranteed to exist in all future versions. Current Tor versions enter these phases in order, monotonically. Future Tors MAY revisit earlier stages. [XXXX: do we revisit earlier stages if the network fails?] [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both exit and internal circuits. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready to handle an application requesting an exit circuit to services like the World Wide Web. If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal circuits. In this case, earlier statuses will have included "internal" as indicated above. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready to handle an application requesting an internal circuit to hidden services at ".onion" addresses. If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.] Phase 0: tag=starting summary="Starting" Tor starts out in this phase. Phase 5: tag=conn_dir summary="Connecting to directory server" Tor sends this event as soon as Tor has chosen a directory server -- e.g. one of the authorities if bootstrapping for the first time or after a long downtime, or one of the relays listed in its cached directory information otherwise. Tor will stay at this phase until it has successfully established a TCP connection with some directory server. Problems in this phase generally happen because Tor doesn't have a network connection, or because the local firewall is dropping SYN packets. Phase 10: tag=handshake_dir summary="Finishing handshake with directory server" This event occurs when Tor establishes a TCP connection with a relay or authority used as a directory server (or its https proxy if it's using one). Tor remains in this phase until the TLS handshake with the relay or authority is finished. Problems in this phase generally happen because Tor's firewall is doing more sophisticated MITM attacks on it, or doing packet-level keyword recognition of Tor's handshake. Phase 15: tag=onehop_create summary="Establishing an encrypted directory connection" Once TLS is finished with a relay, Tor will send a CREATE_FAST cell to establish a one-hop circuit for retrieving directory information. It will remain in this phase until it receives the CREATED_FAST cell back, indicating that the circuit is ready. Phase 20: tag=requesting_status summary="Asking for networkstatus consensus" Once we've finished our one-hop circuit, we will start a new stream for fetching the networkstatus consensus. We'll stay in this phase until we get the 'connected' relay cell back, indicating that we've established a directory connection. Phase 25: tag=loading_status summary="Loading networkstatus consensus" Once we've established a directory connection, we will start fetching the networkstatus consensus document. This could take a while; this phase is a good opportunity for using the "progress" keyword to indicate partial progress. This phase could stall if the directory server we picked doesn't have a copy of the networkstatus consensus so we have to ask another, or it does give us a copy but we don't find it valid. Phase 40: tag=loading_keys summary="Loading authority key certs" Sometimes when we've finished loading the networkstatus consensus, we find that we don't have all the authority key certificates for the keys that signed the consensus. At that point we put the consensus we fetched on hold and fetch the keys so we can verify the signatures. Phase 45 tag=requesting_descriptors summary="Asking for relay descriptors [ for internal paths]" Once we have a valid networkstatus consensus and we've checked all its signatures, we start asking for relay descriptors. We stay in this phase until we have received a 'connected' relay cell in response to a request for descriptors. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will ask for descriptors for both exit and internal paths. If not, Tor will only ask for descriptors for internal paths. In this case, this status will include "internal" as indicated above.] Phase 50: tag=loading_descriptors summary="Loading relay descriptors[ for internal paths]" We will ask for relay descriptors from several different locations, so this step will probably make up the bulk of the bootstrapping, especially for users with slow connections. We stay in this phase until we have descriptors for a significant fraction of the usable relays listed in the networkstatus consensus (this can be between 25% and 95% depending on Tor's configuration and network consensus parameters). This phase is also a good opportunity to use the "progress" keyword to indicate partial steps. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will download descriptors for both exit and internal paths. If not, Tor will only download descriptors for internal paths. In this case, this status will include "internal" as indicated above.] Phase 80: tag=conn_or summary="Connecting to the Tor network[ internally]" Once we have a valid consensus and enough relay descriptors, we choose entry guard(s) and start trying to build some circuits. This step is similar to the "conn_dir" phase above; the only difference is the context. If a Tor starts with enough recent cached directory information, its first bootstrap status event will be for the conn_or phase. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both exit and internal circuits. If not, Tor will only build internal circuits. In this case, this status will include "internal(ly)" as indicated above.] Phase 85: tag=handshake_or summary="Finishing handshake with first hop[ of internal circuit]" This phase is similar to the "handshake_dir" phase, but it gets reached if we finish a TCP connection to a Tor relay and we have already reached the "conn_or" phase. We'll stay in this phase until we complete a TLS handshake with a Tor relay. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor may be finishing a handshake with the first hop if either an exit or internal circuit. In this case, it won't specify which type. If the consensus contains no Exits, Tor will only build internal circuits. In this case, this status will include "internal" as indicated above.] Phase 90: tag=circuit_create summary="Establishing a[n internal] Tor circuit" Once we've finished our TLS handshake with the first hop of a circuit, we will set about trying to make some 3-hop circuits in case we need them soon. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both exit and internal circuits. If not, Tor will only build internal circuits. In this case, this status will include "internal" as indicated above.] Phase 100: tag=done summary="Done" A full 3-hop circuit has been established. Tor is ready to handle application connections now. [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.2-alpha and later): If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both exit and internal circuits. At this stage, Tor will be ready to handle an application requesting an exit circuit to services like the World Wide Web. If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal circuits. In this case, earlier statuses will have included "internal" as indicated above. At this stage, Tor will be ready to handle an application requesting an internal circuit to hidden services at ".onion" addresses. If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.]
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Just a test....